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PORNOGRAPHIC DEEPFAKES:  THE CASE FOR 
FEDERAL CRIMINALIZATION OF REVENGE 
PORN’S NEXT TRAGIC ACT 
Rebecca A. Delfino* 
 
This could happen to you. 
Like millions of people worldwide, you have uploaded digital photographs 
of yourself to the internet through social media platforms.  Your pictures 
aren’t sexually explicit or revealing—they depict your daily life, spending 
time with friends or taking “selfies” on vacation.  But then someone decides 
they don’t like you.  Using an app available on any smartphone, this 
antagonist clips digital images of your face from your innocuous pictures 
and pastes them seamlessly onto the body of a person engaged in sexually 
explicit acts.  Without your knowledge or consent, you become the “star” of 
a realistic, pornographic “deepfake.” 
This hypothetical reflects an emerging phenomenon in sex exploitation 
cybercrimes—it is the next tragic act in the unauthorized public 
dissemination of private, sexually explicit photos or videos known as 
“revenge porn.”  Is there anything you can do if someone inserts you into a 
pornographic deepfake image or video against your will?  Is it against the 
law to create, share, and spread falsified pornography on the internet? 
At best, the answer to these questions is complicated and uncertain.  At 
worst, the answer is no.  Although criminalizing bad acts is the most effective 
deterrent against bad actors, no federal or state laws currently criminalize 
the creation or distribution of pornographic deepfakes.  And since deepfakes 
exist in cyberspace, they are not confined to an individual state jurisdiction.  
This Article is the first to focus on the intersection of the law and 
pornographic deepfakes and to propose a legislative solution to the harms 
they unleash.  Ultimately, this Article proposes a national response rooted in 
federal criminal law because everyone, everywhere is a potential deepfake 
victim—even you. 
 
 
*  Clinical Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  I am grateful and indebted 
to Katherine Brosamle, Jennifer Roges, and Kathleen Simers for their research assistance, 
Loyola Law School for its generous support of faculty scholarship and, as always, my family 
for their patience, indulgence, and encouragement.  This Article is dedicated to my parents, 
Ken and Rosemary Delfino, who not only taught me to discern fact from fiction at a young 
age but also inspired me to care about the difference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Disguise, I see, thou art a wickedness, 
Wherein the pregnant enemy does much. 
—William Shakespeare1 
We are inundated daily, in both real and cyber spaces, with a barrage of 
truthful and fake information, news, images, and videos.  The law has not 
kept pace with the problems that result when we cannot discern fact from 
fiction.  Something new has emerged from the dark corners of the internet in 
recent years:  doctored pornographic images and videos featuring one 
person’s face believably mapped onto a body engaged in sexually explicit 
 
 1. TWELFTH NIGHT act 2, sc. 2. 
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acts, which creators,2 news commentators,3 and academics4 call 
“deepfakes.”5  Although the images are fictitious, having been created using 
new artificial intelligence (AI)–assisted technology, they are offered as true 
images of the individuals—usually women—depicted.  Deepfake technology 
has evolved so quickly that an app designed to create deepfakes is now 
widely available.6  The app lowers the technical threshold required to create 
such images and videos, which will likely make face-swapped, fake porn of 
public figures and private individuals more prevalent.  Now anyone who has 
appeared in a digital image may “star” in pornography against their will, and 
currently, the law provides no clear or direct recourse to stop it. 
 
 2. See Samantha Cole, We Are Truly Fucked:  Everyone Is Making AI-Generated Fake 
Porn Now, VICE:  MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 24, 2018, 10:13 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
en_us/article/bjye8a/reddit-fake-porn-app-daisy-ridley [https://perma.cc/EN85-JSM7] 
(describing how, in late fall 2017, an anonymous Reddit user posted several porn videos on 
the internet under the pseudonym “Deepfakes,” including a video of actress Daisy Ridley’s 
face superimposed on the body of a porn actress); see also Kristen Dold, Face-Swapping Porn:  
How a Creepy Internet Trend Could Threaten Democracy, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 17, 2018, 
8:47 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/face-swapping-porn-how-creepy-
trend-could-threaten-democracy-w518929 [https://perma.cc/7J2Q-J2QD]. 
 3. See, e.g., Oscar Schwartz, You Thought Fake News Was Bad?:  Deep Fakes Are Where 
Truth Goes to Die, GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2018/nov/12/deep-fakes-fake-news-truth [https://perma.cc/2KBB-FDWH]; see 
also All Things Considered:  Technologies to Create Fake Audio and Video Are Quickly 
Evolving, NPR (Apr. 2, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/02/598916380/ 
technologies-to-create-fake-audio- and-video-are-quickly-evolving [https://perma.cc/V5TM-
AUVJ]; BuzzFeed (@BuzzFeed), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
BuzzFeed/status/986257991799222272 [https://perma.cc/6A5J-RBEG]. 
 4. See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes:  A Looming Challenge for 
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3213954 [https://perma.cc/FQG5-RG3Y].  See generally Marc 
Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59 (2018). 
 5. Deepfakes take their name from the Reddit user who first introduced sexually explicit 
doctored videos to the internet. Dold, supra note 2.  The term is a combination of two ideas:  
“deep,” from the concept of “deep learning,” an aspect of artificial intelligence (AI) concerned 
with emulating the learning approach that human beings use to gain certain types of 
knowledge; and “fake,” from the concept of “fake news,” an inaccurate or sensationalistic 
report created to gain attention, mislead, deceive, or damage a reputation. See James Vincent, 
Why We Need a Better Definition of ‘Deepfake,’ VERGE (May 22, 2018, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/17380306/deepfake-definition-ai-manipulation-fake-
news [https://perma.cc/Z2VE-56UV]; see also Margaret Rouse, Deepfake (Deep Fake AI), 
WHATIS.COM, https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/deepfake [https://perma.cc/8UEZ-
4NNP] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  Although the term’s origin is clear, its stylization remains 
an unsettled matter:  it alternately appears as one word (“deepfake”), a hyphenated word 
(“deep-fake”), or two words (“deep fake”).  Legal scholars and politicians appear to use the 
two-word version. See Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018, S. 3805, 115th Cong. 
(2018); Blitz, supra note 4; Chesney & Citron, supra note 4.  The Merriam-Webster blog and 
at least one online tech dictionary, conversely, present it as one word: “deepfake.” See Words 
We’re Watching:  ‘Deepfake,’ MERRIAM-WEBSTER (July 31, 2019), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/words-at-play/deepfake-slang-definition-examples [https://perma.cc/W8FG-
75QU]; see also Rouse, supra.  This Article will use the one-word version because the term 
is a portmanteau, which is a commonplace construction used to describe technology (e.g., 
“Pinterest,” “sexting,” “webinar”). 
 6. See Cole, supra note 2. 
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As deepfake technology becomes more refined and easier to create, the 
law’s inadequacies to protect potential victims have become clear.  Consider 
the following hypothetical:  Othello and Desdemona are in a long-term 
relationship.  Othello is a digital photography buff, and everywhere he and 
Desdemona go—strolling the streets of Venice, sightseeing at the seaport in 
Cyprus, or picnicking in the garden of his castle—Othello takes photos of 
Desdemona with his smartphone.  Desdemona consents to these images but 
has never allowed Othello to take nude or sexually explicit photographs of 
her.  After Othello becomes convinced that Desdemona is having an affair 
with his friend Cassio, Othello and Desdemona break up.  In retaliation, 
Othello uploads all of his digital images of Desdemona onto an app on his 
smartphone that allows him to superimpose Desdemona’s face onto a video 
of a porn actress’s body engaged in pornographic acts.  Othello then uploads 
the deepfake video, along with Desdemona’s contact information, to various 
social media sites online. 
When Desdemona contacts law enforcement to have the pornographic 
deepfake video removed and Othello arrested, they inform her that Othello’s 
conduct is not illegal—he has broken no law.  When she asks whether Othello 
might be charged under the state’s new revenge porn statute or another 
cybercrime statute, they demur and question whether she is a victim of any 
crime at all, since she did not own the photos and Othello used only her face 
in the video.  Unfortunately, Desdemona’s story reflects a new and emerging 
phenomenon in sex exploitation cybercrimes—it is the next tragic act in the 
unauthorized public dissemination of private, sexually explicit photos or 
videos, known as “revenge porn.” 
Part I of this Article defines and explains the phenomenon of deepfakes 
and places them in the broader context of the internet.  This Part first 
considers the potential dangers and risks that deepfakes pose to our society 
and democratic institutions through their connection to fake news and false 
images involving public figures and officials and then focuses on deepfakes 
in the context of nonconsensual pornography and the related phenomenon of 
revenge porn. 
Part II explores the complexity of the legal and prudential issues 
implicated by deepfakes.  For example, determining who has actually been 
victimized by a deepfake can be difficult because each video depicts at least 
two people—the person whose body is truthfully being represented and the 
person whose face has been added.  Is the proper victim the person whose 
face is used, the person whose body is used, or both?  This Part also discusses 
the difficulty of identifying, locating, and bringing perpetrators to justice and 
explores the challenges of removing deepfakes once they have been 
published on the internet in light of the Communications Decency Act of 
1996,7 which shields websites and content distributors from liability for 
third-party content. 
 
 7. Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). 
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Part III begins by examining available criminal legal remedies.  Although 
prosecutors might bring charges of cyberstalking, criminal threats, 
unauthorized access to digital files, and child pornography, current federal 
criminal law does not expressly outlaw deepfakes.  This Part also discusses 
pending federal legislation, including the Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition 
Act of 20188 and the Ending Nonconsensual Online User Graphic 
Harassment Act of 2017.9  Part III discusses the criminal laws of four states—
California, Texas, Florida, and New York—to demonstrate that even the 
states with the highest populations, the greatest number of reported 
cybercrimes, and laws addressing revenge porn have failed to keep pace with 
harms created by deepfake technology. 
Part IV examines the shortcomings and limitations of both existing 
criminal law and proposed federal legislation, arguing that neither can fully 
remedy the harms created by nonconsensual deepfake pornography.  This 
Part also considers First Amendment and censorship concerns. 
Finally, Part V addresses how to solve the problem of nonconsensual 
pornographic deepfakes through the enactment of federal criminal law.  This 
Part proposes a legal solution combining existing elements of proposed 
federal legislation criminalizing revenge porn and deepfakes with new 
elements, including criminal injunctions and victim restitution.  Finally, this 
Part discusses extralegal solutions that should be simultaneously developed 
and deployed.  These solutions include developing effective technological 
content verification and improving the public’s digital literacy so that each 
person consuming online content does so with the same concern:  “internet 
content might be real or fake, and I have to figure that out before I make 
decisions or take actions.” 
I.  THE DEEPFAKE PHENOMENON 
A dangerous new technology has emerged on the internet that blurs fact 
and fiction by allowing users to create deepfakes—doctored images and 
videos that convincingly map one person’s likeness onto another person’s 
body.10  Although this AI-assisted technology has valid and beneficial uses,11 
it can also be misused,12 specifically to generate nonconsensual 
 
 8. S. 3805. 
 9. S. 2162, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 10. Dold, supra note 2. 
 11. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 14–16) (discussing the potential 
“prosocial” applications in education, artistic expression, and self-expression for deepfakes); 
see also Rise of the Deepfakes, WEEK (June 9, 2018), http://theweek.com/articles/777592/rise-
deepfakes [https://perma.cc/2P9A-DRWF] (“The technology has also been used to create 
harmless spoof and parody videos—inserting Reddit cult figure Nicholas Cage into films in 
which he didn’t appear, for example.”). 
 12. Chesney and Citron have identified a litany of potential exploitative uses for deepfake 
technology, from harm to individuals (including sabotage, blackmail, and exploitation) to 
societal harms (including harm to democratic institutions, civil discourse, public safety, and 
national security). See Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 16–29). 
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pornography.13  Most deepfake or “face-swapping porn” superimposes 
images of female celebrities onto the bodies of individuals engaged in sexual 
acts.14  Millions of individuals who have posted digital images on the internet 
are vulnerable to becoming unwitting stars of face-swapped porn via an 
application that easily generates deepfakes.15 
A.  Development of “Deepfake” Technology 
Deepfakes first emerged on the internet in late 2017 when an anonymous 
Reddit16 user uploaded realistic pornographic videos featuring celebrities.17  
Following the release of these original face-swapped porn videos, another 
anonymous Reddit user created and released “FakeApp,” a free application 
enabling users to easily create deepfakes.18  Before FakeApp’s development, 
the production of realistic doctored videos was an expensive and arduous 
process confined to Hollywood movie studios.19  FakeApp’s creator achieved 
the goal of “mak[ing] deepfakes’ technology available to people without a 
technical background or programming experience.”20 
FakeApp works by uploading digital images into a “machine-learning 
algorithm that’s trained itself to stitch one face on top of another,”21 also 
 
 13. Adam Dodge & Erica Johnstone, Using Fake Video Technology to Perpetuate 
Intimate Partner Abuse, WITHOUT MY CONSENT 4, https://withoutmyconsent.org/ 
perch/resources/2018-04-25deepfakedomesticviolenceadvisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6DS-
8G7S] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019); Janko Roettgers, ‘Deep Fakes’ Will Create Hollywood’s 
Next Sex Tape Scare, VARIETY (Feb. 2, 2018, 1:04 PM), http://variety.com/2018/digital/news/ 
hollywood-sex-tapes-deepfakes-ai-1202685655/ [https://perma.cc/Q4Q7-SCM5]. 
 14. See Dold, supra note 2 (listing Emma Watson, Gal Gadot, Taylor Swift, and Daisy 
Ridley as some of the targets of deepfakes); David Lee, Deepfakes Porn Has Serious 
Consequences, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42912529 
[https://perma.cc/R4TY-LJQK] (discussing how deepfakes have targeted celebrities). 
 15. See generally Dodge & Johnstone, supra note 13 (explaining the likelihood that 
domestic abusers and cyberstalkers will use deepfakes to harm victims). 
 16. Reddit is among the top ten most popular websites in the United States and the top 
twenty in the world and has branded itself as the “front page of the internet.” See Jake Widman 
& Will Nicol, What Is Reddit?:  A Beginner’s Guide to the Front Page of the Internet, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (May 22, 2019, 6:58 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/what-is-
reddit/ [https://perma.cc/6ATF-U9FE].  It is a collection of web forums, also known as 
“subreddits,” where communities of users share news and content or comment on posts about 
specific topics ranging from the straightforward to the unconventional. Id.  The name of a 
subreddit colloquially begins with “r/,” mimicking Reddit’s URL structure.  On r/shakespeare, 
for example, users discuss William Shakespeare and his work, while on r/birdswitharms, they 
post pictures of birds with arms. Id. 
 17. Rise of the Deepfakes, supra note 11. 
 18. Derek Hawkins, Reddit Bans ‘Deepfakes,’ Pornography Using the Faces of 
Celebrities Such as Taylor Swift and Gal Gadot, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/02/08/reddit-bans-deepfakes-
pornography-using-the-faces-of-celebrities-like-taylor-swift-and-gal-gadot/ 
[https://perma.cc/2TPE-AYBG]. 
 19. See Kevin Roose, Here Come the Fake Videos, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/technology/fake-videos-deepfakes.html 
[https://perma.cc/6QA8-78NL]; see also Hawkins, supra note 18 (explaining that FakeApp 
“put deepfake technology into a user-friendly package”); Lee, supra note 14. 
 20. Cole, supra note 2. 
 21. Dold, supra note 2. 
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known as AI deep learning.22  This AI-assisted technology analyzes and 
manipulates images of a person’s face and then maps it onto a different 
person’s body in a video.23  Creating a “face-swapped” video is an easy five-
step process.24 
Further, FakeApp can extract images from Google, Instagram, and 
Facebook to create face-swapped porn, hence the prevalence of celebrity 
deepfakes.25 
B.  The Proliferation of Deepfakes 
Although digital impersonation technology has most notably been used to 
produce realistic pornographic videos, it may also be employed to create fake 
news and false images involving politicians and governmental actors.26  This 
AI-assisted technology could be used to create fake videos of politicians 
accepting bribes, soldiers committing war crimes, presidential candidates 
engaging in criminal behavior, and emergency officials announcing an 
impending terrorist attack.27  All of these examples have the potential to 
cause harm to our democracy, particularly because the technology used to 
generate these videos is rapidly advancing.28  For instance, researchers from 
the University of Washington generated a photorealistic, lip-synced video of 
President Barack Obama “by mapping audio from one speech onto an 
existing video of him talking.”29  The researchers could successfully generate 
this realistic video because there was “significant video footage available 
online, in the form of interviews, speeches, newscasts, etc.”30  Additionally, 
sound engineers used AI technology to “synthesiz[e] 116,777 voice 
samples—each 0.4 seconds long—from 831 of [President John F. 
 
 22. Dodge & Johnstone, supra note 13, at 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. The process involves the following steps:  “1. Download a program like FakeApp.  2. 
Ensure your computer has a reasonably powerful graphics card . . . .  3. Identify the video to 
be used.  4. Collect, scrape or take hundreds of photographs . . . to be superimposed into the 
video.  5. Feed the photos into FakeApp and run the program.” Id. at 5. 
 25. Id. at 6; Sarah Rense, What Are ‘Deepfakes,’ and Why Are Pornhub and Reddit 
Banning Them?, ESQUIRE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.esquire.com/lifestyle/sex/a17043863/ 
what-are-deepfakes-celebrity-porn/ [https://perma.cc/3QQS-XUCF]. 
 26. See Dold, supra note 2 (“What’s most concerning about deepfake tech is that seedy 
porn is just a preview of what’s to come elsewhere.”); Lee, supra note 14 (claiming that 
deepfake technology “could down the road be used maliciously to hoax governments and 
populations, or cause international conflict”); see also Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 
(manuscript at 16–29).  A Google search of a person’s name can render many high-quality 
images associated with their identity, which would be ideal for digital misappropriation. 
 27. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 16–29); see also John Donovan, 
Deepfake Videos Are Getting Scary Good, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Sept. 5, 2018), https:// 
electronics.howstuffworks.com/future-tech/deepfake-videos-scary-good.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/D6FA-HJA9]. 
 28. See Rise of the Deepfakes, supra note 11 (noting that “deep learning” technology used 
to power deepfakes is improving fast). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Supasorn Suwajanakorn et al., Synthesizing Obama:  Learning Lip Sync from Audio, 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON GRAPHICS, July 2017, at 95:1, 95:1. 
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Kennedy’s] speeches and radio addresses”31 to create, in his own voice, the 
speech he would have delivered on November 22, 1963, had he not been 
assassinated earlier that day.  Furthermore, filmmaker Jordan Peele used AI-
assisted technology to create a doctored public service announcement by 
President Obama warning about fake videos.32  Differentiating real videos 
and news from doctored videos and images will become increasingly difficult 
as deepfake technology continues to evolve. 
The recent swell of deepfakes highlights the inadequacy of the law and 
raises complex questions about how to solve the problems deepfakes 
present.33  Although websites like Reddit, Pornhub, and Twitter have banned 
pornographic deepfakes,34 this AI-assisted technology will likely continue to 
have an increasing presence in society.35  With FakeApp and other social 
media apps, like Snapchat, offering face-morphing technology, more and 
more individuals will have the unregulated ability to create realistic doctored 
videos.36  To protect victims of deepfakes and to prevent the negative societal 
consequences they cause, the laws need to keep pace with this technology. 
C.  Deepfakes in the Context of Nonconsensual Pornography 
Although deepfakes have primarily targeted celebrities, private individuals 
can just as easily find their likenesses used in a face-swapped porn video.37  
The proliferation of social media accounts and the public sharing of 
photographs enable FakeApp users to gather images from any individual’s 
Instagram or Facebook account to create a doctored video.38  For instance, 
Reddit users openly discussed how best to create deepfakes featuring friends, 
teachers, and ex-partners.39 
Because deepfake technology can be used to create realistic pornographic 
videos without the consent of the individuals depicted, and since these videos 
can be broadly distributed on the internet, pornographic deepfakes exist in 
 
 31. Yaron Steinbuch, Listen to JFK Speak from Beyond the Grave, N.Y. POST (Mar. 16, 
2018, 12:05 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/03/16/jfks-voice-delivers-speech-he-never-gave-
day-of-assassination/ [https://perma.cc/TJQ9-6AFQ]. 
 32. Morgan Gstalter, ‘Obama’ Voiced by Jordan Peele in PSA Video Warning About Fake 
Videos, HILL (Apr. 17, 2018, 12:08 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know/in-the-
know/383525-obama-voiced-by-jordan-peele-in-psa-video-warning-about-fake 
[https://perma.cc/9F4R-466W]. 
 33. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 30–58). 
 34. Hawkins, supra note 18. 
 35. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2–4, 8–14). 
 36. See Reid McCarter, Idiots on the Internet Are Getting Really Good at Splicing Nic 
Cage’s Face onto Every Movie, AV CLUB (Sept. 4, 2018, 10:30 AM), 
https://news.avclub.com/idiots-on-the-internet-are-getting-really-good-at-splic-1828799192 
[https://perma.cc/5VAP-WQTK]; see also Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 8–
14). 
 37. Dodge & Johnstone, supra note 13, at 3. 
 38. Lee, supra note 14 (explaining that private individuals can be targeted in deepfakes as 
long as clear images of the individuals are accessible). 
 39. Samantha Cole, People Are Using AI to Create Fake Porn of Their Friends and 
Classmates, VICE:  MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 26, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
en_us/article/ev5eba/ai-fake-porn-of-friends-deepfakes [https://perma.cc/8EPJ-GNNA]. 
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the realm of other sexually exploitative cybercrimes such as revenge porn 
and nonconsensual pornography.40  Revenge porn is the act of “disclosing a 
private, sexually explicit image to someone other than the intended audience” 
without the consent of the involved individuals.41  It describes the 
distribution of genuine, as opposed to doctored, sexually explicit photos or 
videos without the subject’s consent.42  Typically, partners in an intimate 
relationship consensually share photos or videos that one partner later 
distributes in retaliation against the other.43 
Revenge porn materials, however, can also be stolen and used by strangers 
through hacking or theft of a cell phone or computer.44  Hackers may post 
these images and videos online with (or without) the victim’s personal 
identifying information.45  Revenge porn is also referred to more broadly as 
“nonconsensual pornography,” which includes sexually explicit images or 
videos recorded without the individual’s consent, such as hidden 
recordings.46 
Pornographic deepfakes and revenge porn have troubling commonalities.  
First, like revenge porn, pornographic deepfakes predominately affect 
women.47  One journalist described deepfakes as “a way for men to have their 
full, fantastical way with women’s bodies.”48  Second, both revenge porn and 
pornographic deepfakes involve the nonconsensual distribution of sexually 
explicit material.  Victims of revenge porn do not consent to public 
dissemination of their sexual images and videos, and likewise, victims of 
deepfakes do not agree to manipulation of their face onto the body of an 
individual engaging in sexual acts.  Thus, revenge porn and deepfakes both 
violate individuals’ expectations that sexual activity be founded on consent.49 
 
 40. See Jeff John Roberts, Fake Porn Videos Are Terrorizing Women.  Do We Need a Law 
to Stop Them?, FORTUNE (Jan. 15, 2019), http://fortune.com/2019/01/15/deepfakes-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/TNA3-G7TM]. 
 41. MARY ANNE FRANKS, DRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE “REVENGE PORN” LAW:  A GUIDE FOR 
LEGISLATORS 2 (2016), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Guide-
for-Legislators-9.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3KB-Q7YQ]; see also Danielle Keats Citron & 
Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014). 
 42. See generally Andrew Gilden, Sex, Death, and Intellectual Property, 32 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 67 (2018) (describing revenge porn). 
 43. Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 346. 
 44. Cyber Exploitation—Law Enforcement FAQs, OFF. ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/ 
sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ce/cyber-exploitation-law-enforcement-faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
FBX2-55YZ] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Cyber Exploitation FAQs]. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 346. 
 47. Id. at 347–48 (“Our society has a poor track record in addressing harms that take 
women and girls as their primary targets.”). 
 48. Samantha Cole, Deepfakes Were Created as a Way to Own Women’s Bodies—We 
Can’t Forget That, VICE:  BROADLY (June 18, 2018, 2:10 PM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/ 
article/nekqmd/deepfake-porn-origins-sexism-reddit-v25n2 [https://perma.cc/7FJ4-99T8]. 
 49. Dodge & Johnstone, supra note 13, at 4. 
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Both revenge porn and pornographic deepfakes can have lasting effects for 
victims50 and can cause similar emotional and psychological harms.51  
Notably, revenge porn not only harms a person’s reputation and emotional 
well-being but also poses risks of significant academic, professional, and 
even physical injury.52  Physical safety concerns include violence, stalking, 
or other criminal acts.53 
Despite the substantial similarities between pornographic deepfakes and 
revenge porn, they differ in meaningful ways, and these dissimilarities 
present unique challenges to victims of deepfakes seeking remedies for harm 
caused.  First, deepfakes may constitute benign artistic expression, whereas 
revenge porn is always a crime.  Indeed, the deepfakes that have garnered the 
most attention involve public figures and celebrities in harmless and 
humorous juxtapositions—for instance, Steve Buscemi’s face imposed on 
Jennifer Lawrence’s body in a video clip in which the actress discusses her 
favorite “Real Housewife.”54  In such depictions, where the video is 
unquestionably fake, the viewer is “in” on the joke—thus, even pornographic 
deepfakes have historically been viewed through the lens of entertainment 
and artistic expression rather than crime.55 
Revenge porn, in contrast, depicts private individuals engaged in intimate 
acts that were intended to remain private and were not recorded for mass 
dissemination or entertainment.  Indeed, scholars’ arguments in support of 
imposing civil and criminal liability for acts of revenge porn have centered 
on the violation of the victim’s right to sexual privacy.56 
Pornographic deepfakes do not raise these same sexual privacy concerns.  
Because deepfakes arguably do not depict a person who exists,57 no 
individual’s privacy is clearly at stake in a deepfake.  Nonetheless, in the case 
 
 50. See Cyber Exploitation FAQs, supra note 44 (quoting the Cyber Civil Rights 
Initiative’s 2014 “End Revenge Porn” survey, which showed that an overwhelming amount 
of those affected by revenge porn are women); see also Revenge Porn Statistics, CYBER C.R. 
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/RPStatistics.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/29NH-7848] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 51. Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 347; Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript 
at 16–20). 
 52. See sources cited supra note 51. 
 53. See sources cited supra note 51. 
 54. See birbfakes, Jennifer Lawrence-Buscemi on Her Favorite Housewives [Deepfake], 
YOUTUBE (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1jng79a5xc [https:// 
perma.cc/VDT2-L54N]. 
 55. See Madeline Buxton, The Deep Dark World of Fake Porn, REFINERY29, 
https://www.refinery29.com/en-gb/2018/02/190383/deepfakes-ai-assisted-fake-porn 
[https://perma.cc/6NPX-KKQX] (last updated Feb. 7, 2018, 4:00 PM); see also Hawkins, 
supra note 18 (“U.S. law offers little recourse to victims of face-swap porn, largely because 
courts thus far have viewed such material in the same realm as parody or satire, which enjoy 
strong First Amendment protections.”). 
 56. See Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 350–56. 
 57. The deepfakes at issue in this Article—those that are the subject of the proposed 
statute described in Part V—involve face swapping, where the image of one person’s face is 
believably mapped onto the body of another person engaged in a pornographic act.  Other 
varieties of deepfakes, such as those involving the manipulation of an identifiable person’s 
speech or image to simulate fake conduct or speech, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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of a private individual whose face was used to create a pornographic 
deepfake, the viewer may not realize the video depiction is a fake and may 
instead assume that the video is a genuine depiction of a real person. 
In addition, deepfakes also differ from other forms of nonconsensual 
pornography and revenge porn because of the nearly incalculable number of 
potential victims.  Possible victims of deepfake pornography include both 
individuals who consensually appeared in sexually explicit digital images 
that were later nonconsensually disclosed (i.e., traditional victims of revenge 
porn) and anyone whose image has been captured digitally.58 
II.  THE PRUDENTIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES OF DEEPFAKES 
The rapid influx of face-swapped porn videos, as well as expeditious 
advancements in the technology powering the deepfake phenomenon, raises 
complex legal and prudential issues.  This Part will address the difficulty of 
identifying the perpetrators and victims of deepfakes and the challenge of 
convincing internet platforms to remove deepfakes from websites in light of 
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).  Given these challenges, 
there is a need for a criminal law response. 
A.  Defining and Recognizing Deepfake Victims 
This new technology raises the issue of defining and identifying victims 
of deepfakes, which depict two people:  the person whose body is engaging 
in sexual acts and the person whose face has been transposed onto that 
body.59  Although two different people appear in these videos, articles and 
commentators have generally classified the “victim” as the person whose 
face was wrongly used.60  But should the person whose body is used also be 
classified as a victim if consent was not obtained to use that person’s body?  
In addition, how should the law determine harm when deepfakes do not 
expose actual intimate details of victims’ lives?  How can liability be 
imposed when no real person has been exposed?  The person whose face was 
used likely did not agree to participate in pornography, but consent is less 
clear as to that person whose body was depicted.  Although the actor whose 
body is featured may have consented to the original pornographic video, they 
likely never agreed to have another person’s face superimposed onto their 
body.  They too have been victimized.  Thus, both people depicted in the 
deepfake should be presumed to be victims. 
B.  Challenges of Identifying Perpetrators and Seeking Recourse 
Deepfakes also raise the complex problem of identifying perpetrators and 
removing videos after they have been published on the internet.  Once a video 
is posted online, it is difficult to remove it, and, usually, the reputational and 
 
 58. Buxton, supra note 55. 
 59. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9, 16–17). 
 60. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 16–20). 
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emotional damage is already done.61  Ideally, the law should hold responsible 
the individual who created and published a deepfake video online.  However, 
it can be challenging to locate or identify the perpetrator who created a 
deepfake for two reasons.  First, many websites, such as Reddit, Twitter, and 
Pornhub, allow anonymous use; predictably, deepfakes have flourished on 
these platforms.62  And second, deepfake creators can use software like Tor 
to make the IP address associated with a deepfake untraceable.63 
Because of the elusiveness of perpetrators, victims may consider pursuing 
action directly involving or against the internet platform where the video was 
posted.  Such recourse implicates section 230 of the CDA,64 which shields 
websites from civil and criminal liability under state law for third-party 
content.  Under section 230, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”65  This provision protects 
content providers from incurring liability as intermediaries for third-party 
content posted on their websites.66  In theory, this immunity safeguards free 
expression on the internet by eliminating the fear of liability for the actions 
of third-party users.67  Section 230 allows websites to host videos, reviews, 
classified ads, and social networking profiles created by hundreds of millions 
of internet users without being liable for that content.68  Although section 
230 has been lauded as one of the most important laws protecting internet 
 
 61. Megan Farokhmanesh, Is It Legal to Swap Someone’s Face into Porn Without 
Consent?, VERGE (Jan. 30, 2018, 2:39 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/30/16945494/ 
deepfakes-porn-face-swap-legal [https://perma.cc/5HP9-FQM6] (“It’s almost impossible to 
erase a video once it’s been published to the internet . . . .  If you’re looking for the magic 
wand that can erase that video permanently, it probably doesn’t exist.” (quoting Eric Goldman, 
a law professor at Santa Clara University School of Law)). 
 62. See Rise of the Deepfakes, supra note 11 (noting that “deepfakes” were first posted to 
Reddit by a user that remains anonymous); Roose, supra note 19 (noting that the creator of 
FakeApp has remained anonymous). 
 63. See Andy Greenberg, It’s About to Get Even Easier to Hide on the Dark Web, WIRED 
(Jan. 20, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/get-even-easier-hide-dark-web/ 
[https://perma.cc/HKB6-C924] (explaining how Tor allows for anonymous internet use). 
 64. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).  Section 230 states, in relevant part, that 
[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. 
Id. § 230(c)(2). 
 65. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 66. See id.; see also Patricia Spiccia, Note, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free:  Why 
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be Earned and Not 
Freely Given, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 379 (2013). 
 67. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/N9CT-XXPY] (last visited Nov. 12, 
2019); see also Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media:  A Layer-Conscious Approach, 
24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 196–97 (2018). 
 68. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, supra note 67. 
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speech,69 the law also enables internet platforms to host revenge porn—and, 
now, deepfakes—with impunity.70 
Section 230 immunity makes it difficult for deepfake victims to sue 
internet platforms for hosting deepfakes.71  Victims of revenge porn and 
deepfakes are unlikely to pierce CDA immunity because “courts give a high 
degree of deference to website hosts under Section 230.”72  Courts have 
interpreted the CDA broadly to effect Congress’s intent to “encourage free 
and open communication on the Internet, even if that communication 
includes potentially harmful speech or conduct.”73 
Indeed, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,74 the Ninth Circuit found that section 
230 barred a claim “for negligent provision of services” after Yahoo! failed 
to take down reported sexually explicit images of the plaintiff posted by her 
ex-boyfriend.  Barnes “demonstrates the force of Section 230 . . . in barring 
potential revenge porn cases against website hosts.”75  The same result would 
certainly follow for a claim based on a deepfake.  Section 230 would likely 
shield websites from liability for hosting deepfakes posted by users.  Thus, 
deepfake victims will be left without recourse to law if they can neither locate 
the perpetrators of deepfakes because of anonymity nor sue the internet 
platforms due to section 230.  Even if a perpetrator is identified, successful 
litigation against deepfake creators will not bind content providers. 
Despite the protection the CDA affords, many internet platforms have 
independently banned deepfakes and removed the videos from their 
platforms.76  Reddit announced new policies regarding involuntary 
pornography, which prohibit the dissemination of images or video depicting 
any person nude or engaged in any act of sexual conduct created or posted 
without their permission, “including depictions that have been faked.”77  
 
 69. Kate Klonick, The New Governors:  The People, Rules, and Processes Governing 
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1604 (2018) (noting that the CDA is often called 
“the law that matters most for speech on the Web”). 
 70. Samantha Cole, Targets of Fake Porn Are at the Mercy of Big Platforms, VICE:  
MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 5, 2018, 12:44 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
59kzx3/targets-of-fake-porn-deepfakes-are-at-the-mercy-of-big-platforms [https://perma.cc/ 
6MJF-KHRN]. 
 71. Rachel Budde Patton, Note, Taking the Sting Out of Revenge Porn:  Using Criminal 
Statutes to Safeguard Sexual Autonomy in the Digital Age, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 407, 423–
24 (2015). 
 72. Id. at 423. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 75. Patton, supra note 71, at 424. 
 76. Natalie Gil, “Deepfake” Porn:  The New Way Women Are Being Exploited Online, 
REFINERY29 (June 21, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-gb/2018/06/202456/ 
deepfake-pornography [https://perma.cc/J75W-MJJK] (identifying Twitter, Pornhub, Gfycat 
(a GIF-hosting service), and Discord (a gaming chat platform) as platforms that ban 
deepfakes). 
 77. Account and Community Restrictions:  Do Not Post Involuntary Pornography, 
REDDIT, https://www.reddithelp.com/en/categories/rules-reporting/account-and-community-
restrictions/do-not-post-involuntary-pornography [https://perma.cc/23EF-SYBD] (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2019); see also Account and Community Restrictions:  Do Not Post Sexual or 
Suggestive Content Involving Minors, REDDIT, https://www.reddithelp.com/en/categories/ 
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Pornhub similarly declared that it considered deepfakes to be nonconsensual 
pornography that violated the platform’s terms of service.78  Twitter also 
vowed to suspend all accounts that distribute or produce nonconsensual 
pornography.79  More recently, Tumblr announced its new policy banning 
the “unwanted sexualization or sexual harassment of others.”80 
The challenges of defining the victims, finding the perpetrators, and 
holding internet platforms responsible are further muddled by the unclear 
application of current law to deepfakes.  The same distortion and anonymity 
issues involved in deepfakes’ creation make it difficult to naturally fit these 
doctored videos into existing laws, which does not settle the question of who 
should be held responsible for acts involving deepfakes.  Some remedies 
focus on the creators of the content, others focus on the social networks that 
fail to monitor the content properly, and some involve both.  Notably, 
platforms like Pornhub have been largely unsuccessful in removing current 
content and stopping creators from posting new content; this alone 
demonstrates a clear need for legal solutions for both the networks and 
creators.81 
 
rules-reporting/account-and-community-restrictions/do-not-post-sexual-or-suggestive 
[https://perma.cc/3F54-P7KX] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 78. Tom McKay, Pornhub Says Digitally Generated ‘Deepfakes’ Are Non-Consensual 
and It Will Remove Them, GIZMODO (Feb. 6, 2018, 9:30 PM), https://gizmodo.com/pornhub-
says-digitally-generated-deepfakes-are-non-cons-1822786071 [https://perma.cc/6EJH-
E7HU]; Terms & Conditions, PORNHUB, https://www.pornhub.com/information#terms 
[https://perma.cc/UB7Q-9D78] (last updated May 18, 2018). 
 79. Non-Consensual Nudity Policy, TWITTER (Mar. 2019), https://help.twitter.com/en/ 
rules-and-policies/intimate-media [https://perma.cc/F36B-G4UB]; James Vincent, Twitter Is 
Removing Face-Swapped AI Porn from Its Platform, Too, VERGE (Feb. 7, 2018, 8:14 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/7/16984360/twitter-ban-fake-porn-ai-face-swap [https:// 
perma.cc/NE6B-HSXL];  
 80. Tumblr Bans Non-Consensual Creepshots and Deepfake Porn, BBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45323287 [https://perma.cc/TXK4-5BP2]; see 
also Community Guidelines, TUMBLR (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.tumblr.com/policy/ 
en/community [https://perma.cc/P3E5-ULPQ].  Although it is promising that internet 
platforms have publicly renounced pornographic deepfakes, they remain readily accessible on 
internet sites such as Reddit and Pornhub.  Reddit, Pornhub, Twitter, and Tumblr rely on users 
to spot and report deepfakes. Rense, supra note 25.  Deepfakes keep appearing on these 
internet platforms because “policing every piece of content is virtually impossible.” Id.  
Further, perpetrators are turning to alternative internet platforms like Erome and Sendvid to 
post deepfakes once their content is removed. McKay, supra note 78.  More concerningly, 
Naughty America, an adult entertainment company, has begun to monetize deepfakes by 
allowing users to commission their own deepfake clips. Janko Roettgers, Naughty America 
Wants to Monetize Deepfake Porn, VARIETY (Aug. 20, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://variety.com/ 
2018/digital/news/deepfake-porn-custom-clips-naughty-america-1202910584/ 
[https://perma.cc/4PLT-BK7V].  Naughty America CEO Andreas Hronopoulos described 
“customization and personalization as the future” of the porn industry. Id. 
 81. Bryan Clark, Pornhub Promised to Ban ‘Deepfakes’ Videos.  And It Failed Miserably., 
TNW (Apr. 18, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/insider/2018/04/19/pornhub-promised-to-ban-
deepfakes-videos-and-it-failed-miserably/ [https://perma.cc/GYC8-48AF]. 
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C.  The Need for Criminal Law Responses 
Each potential deepfake victim faces unique legal hurdles.  For example, 
a victim whose face was used will encounter the issue of whether they can 
seek redress for exposure of intimate details which are not their intimate 
details.  Conversely, the victim whose body is represented in a deepfake may 
have trouble proving that their body is significantly identifiable to qualify as 
a recognizable misrepresentation.  And even if both individuals are 
recognized as victims, they must separately prove the harm caused by the 
deepfake, which is problematic because the videos are not exposing intimate 
details of any single victim’s life.82 
Even if harm can be shown, victims identified, and creators located, 
obtaining and enforcing a remedy can prove challenging.  Civil liability 
offers one legal means to remedy harm and incentivize actors to conform to 
societal norms of acceptable behavior.  Other scholars writing in this area 
have begun to identify and evaluate the potential civil claims and market 
responses to address the problem of deepfakes.83 
Civil liability, however, has limitations and often falls short.  For example, 
many creators of deepfakes may be judgment-proof, and therefore imposing 
civil liability may not deter their conduct.  In addition, victims of deepfakes, 
especially those whose bodies (rather than their faces) have been used in the 
depiction, may not want their identities widely disseminated or known; civil 
plaintiffs must sue in their own names.  Second, the high cost of investigating 
and litigating deepfake cases will limit those who can obtain a civil remedy 
to only plaintiffs who have the resources to pursue such claims.  And even if 
those claims prove successful against the creator of the deepfake, there is no 
guarantee that the deepfake will be removed from the internet, given the 
immunity granted to third-party providers under the CDA.84 
A criminal law remedy does not face the same challenges as civil remedies.  
Indeed, criminalizing deepfakes will have a greater deterrent effect on 
creators.  Professors Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron have observed that 
“being judgment proof might spare someone from fear of civil suit, but it is 
no protection from being sent to prison.”85  In addition, law enforcement has 
resources far beyond the capacity of most litigants, even celebrities, that can 
be brought to bear in the investigation and prosecution of deepfakes.  
Scholars who urge the criminalization of revenge porn have successfully 
deployed these same arguments.86  In addition, over the last one hundred 
 
 82. Emma Grey Ellis, People Can Put Your Face on Porn—and the Law Can’t Help You, 
WIRED (Jan. 26, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/face-swap-porn-legal-limbo/ 
[https://perma.cc/5VSH-CYRA]. 
 83. Solutions emerging in civil law and the regulatory arena warrant additional 
exploration and are beyond the scope of this Article.  The possibility of imposing civil liability 
on the perpetrators of deepfakes and civil remedies to the victims is the subject of thoughtful 
scholarship by others. See, e.g., Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 31–41). 
 84. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 85. Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 42). 
 86. See Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 361–65 (discussing the importance of 
criminalizing revenge porn because civil remedies do not address the harm); see also Taylor 
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years, the criminalization of invasions of personal privacy has gained support 
in the legal literature87 and the law—from criminal penalties for disclosure 
of private financial88 and health information89 to identity theft90 to the Video 
Voyeurism Prevention Act of 200491 that bans intentionally recording or 
broadcasting an image of another person in a state of undress.  Finally, a 
criminal response to nonconsensual pornographic deepfakes sends a 
powerful message beyond that conveyed in the context of civil remedies.  
Criminalizing conduct communicates that society finds the behavior 
intolerable.92  Specifically, it conveys the view that the conduct is not trivial 
and that it is not only hurtful to the individual involved but also harmful and 
offensive to the community.93  Given that these deepfakes disproportionately 
victimize women and girls, a societal response—in the form of criminal 
punishment—is warranted. 
III.  THE STATE OF THE LAW 
For more than two hundred years, lawmakers have recognized the need for 
law and our legal institutions to keep pace with technology.94  The reality, 
however, does not square with that aspiration.95  The law lags, struggling to 
 
Linkous, It’s Time for Revenge Porn to Get a Taste of Its Own Medicine:  An Argument for 
the Federal Criminalization of Revenge Porn, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, 36–37 (2014) (urging 
the federal criminalization of revenge porn). 
 87. Almost 130 years ago, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis first argued that 
criminal laws should punish as a felony the publication of “‘any statement concerning the 
private life or affairs of another, after being requested in writing . . . not to publish such 
statement’ provided that the statement does not concern someone’s qualifications for public 
office or profession or involve a matter of public interest.” Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 
346 n.11 (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 219 n.8 (1890)). 
 88. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012). 
 89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012). 
 90. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012). 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 1801. 
 92. Writing about the criminalization of domestic violence, Citron observed that, “Law 
creates a public set of meanings and shared understandings between the state and the public” 
and that, “[b]ecause law creates and shapes social mores, it has an important cultural impact.” 
Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 373, 407 (2009). 
 93. See Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 361–63. 
 94. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 37, 42–43 (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1899).  In 1816, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote: 
Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.  
As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, 
new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of 
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. 
Id. at 43. 
 95. Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. presented two ideas that dictate the relationship between 
law and technology—first, that technological change is a major source of human problems 
that the law must address and second, that “law lags [behind] technology” because market 
forces and the common law tradition have required “that the legal system should not 
predetermine the course of technology application and product development.” HENRY H. 
PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 2–3 (1996). 
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keep pace with rapidly evolving technology.96  The law on deepfakes is no 
exception.97  The focus here is on federal and state laws, primarily criminal, 
that are currently used to punish similar conduct, including the creation and 
distribution of nonconsensual pornography and revenge porn.  Such laws 
may provide an analogy and analytical framework to deploy in the context of 
deepfakes. 
A.  Federal Law 
No specific federal law criminalizes deepfakes or revenge porn.  
Therefore, federal legislators and federal prosecutors continue to grapple 
with the criminalization of nonconsensual pornography posted on the 
internet. 
1.  Existing Federal Criminal Law 
Without any law directly on point, prosecutors look to other federal 
criminal laws relating to cyberexploitation to prosecute individuals who 
make and distribute deepfakes.98  These include various provisions under 
title 18 of the U.S. Code that criminalize communications involving ransom, 
extortion, and kidnapping threats; cyberharassment; and cyberstalking.99  
Possible useful statutory provisions include those governing threats made 
through interstate communication; unauthorized access to a computer; and 
stalking as interstate domestic violence.100  Each provision will be evaluated 
in turn. 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), a culpable person can receive a fine, 
imprisonment for up to two years, or both where he:  “(1) knowingly make[s] 
a communication containing a true threat to injure in interstate commerce or 
foreign commerce, and (2) intends the communication to be a true threat to 
injure another or knows that the recipient of the threat would understand it to 
be a threat.”101  Assuming that uploading a deepfake qualifies as a 
“communication”102 under section 875 and further assuming the other 
 
 96. Id. “Law lag” is the notion that the law is always falling behind other industries and 
that technoscientific inventiveness is an “agenda-setting force to which the law responds only 
by reaction.” Sheila Jasanoff, Making Order:  Law and Science in Action, in 3 THE HANDBOOK 
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 761, 768–69 (Edward J. Hackett et al. eds., 2008). 
 97. Chris Meserole & Alina Polyakova, The West Is Ill-Prepared for the Wave of “Deep 
Fakes” That Artificial Intelligence Could Unleash, BROOKINGS (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/25/the-west-is-ill-prepared-for-
the-wave-of-deep-fakes-that-artificial-intelligence-could-unleash/ [https://perma.cc/NNL4-
9F8D]. 
 98. Cyber Exploitation FAQs, supra note 44. 
 99. Margaret S. Groban, Intimate Partner Cyberstalking—Terrorizing Intimate Partners 
with 21st Century Technology, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., May 2016, at 12, 12–14. 
 100.  See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 875, 1030, 2261A (2012). 
 101. Cyber Exploitation FAQs, supra note 44 (paraphrasing 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). 
 102. For example, in United States v. Jeffries, the Sixth Circuit held that a music video was 
a threatening communication under § 875(c) because “the statute covers ‘any threat,’ making 
no distinction between threats delivered orally (in person, by phone) or in writing (letters, 
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elements of section 875(c) are met, a prosecutor may be able to charge the 
creator of a deepfake with a violation of section 875(c). 
Charges might also be brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 for unauthorized 
access to a computer—that is, computer hacking.103  This provision can be 
used where the nonconsensual pornographic materials were gathered via 
unauthorized access to the victim’s computer or email.104  Penalties again 
can include fines, imprisonment, or both105 and can also increase depending 
on how a person gains access.  For example, if the information is obtained 
through the use of stolen usernames and passwords, an aggravated identity 
theft charge with a mandatory two-year sentence can be applied.106 
Third, federal prosecutors have used the federal cyberstalking statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2261A, to prosecute crimes similar to deepfakes and revenge 
porn.107  This provision applies where the conduct “places [a] person in 
reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to . . . (i) that person; 
(ii) an immediate family member; or (iii) a spouse or intimate partner of that 
person.”108  The accused must have the intent to “kill, injure, harass, 
intimidate, or place [the victim] under surveillance” with the same intent and 
can be punished by a fine, imprisonment, or both.109  Therefore, if 
distributing revenge materials is coupled with, or rises to the level of, 
cyberstalking, then a person can be held criminally liable.110  In United States 
v. Matusiewicz,111 prosecutors defeated an overbreadth challenge to 18 
U.S.C. § 2261A(2) and in doing so opened the door for this provision to be 
applied to nonconsensual pornography in cyberstalking instances.112 
Finally, if the nonconsensual revenge porn material involves minors, a 
person may face charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 for production of child 
pornography and 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for enticement or coercion of a 
minor.113  In a study published in 2016, at least 3 percent of revenge porn 
victims were between the ages of fifteen and seventeen,114 but research from 
 
emails, faxes), by video or by song, in old-fashioned ways or in the most up-to-date.” 692 F.3d 
473, 482 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 103. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030; Groban, supra note 99, at 16. 
 104. Groban, supra note 99, at 16. 
 105. See Cyber Exploitation FAQs, supra note 44. 
 106. See generally United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1)(A), 2261A(2)(A) (2012); see Katlyn M. Brady, Revenge in 
Modern Times:  The Necessity of a Federal Law Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 28 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 12 (2017). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1)(A). 
 109. Id.; see Cyber Exploitation FAQs, supra note 44. 
 110. According to a survey by EndRevengePorn.org, 49 percent of respondents said they 
have been harassed or stalked online by users that have seen the content of the revenge porn 
posted about them. Revenge Porn Statistics, supra note 50 (showing the results of the survey 
hosted on EndRevengePorn.org from August 2012 to December 2013, with an important note 
that the sample was heavily female). 
 111. 84 F. Supp. 3d 363 (D. Del. 2015). 
 112. Id. at 366–68. 
 113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2422(b). 
 114. Amanda Lenhart et al., Nonconsensual Image Sharing:  One in 25 Americans Has 
Been a Victim of “Revenge Porn,” DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST. (Dec. 13, 2016), 
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BBC News shows that revenge porn victims worldwide are as young as 
eleven years old.115  Where a victim is underage, these provisions may apply 
to the prosecution of those responsible for the creation and distribution of 
these materials. 
2.  Previously Proposed Federal Criminal Statutes 
Legal scholars116 and internet advocacy organizations and activists117 have 
coalesced around the cause of victims of nonconsensual pornography 
advocating for the adoption of a federal statute expressly criminalizing this 
conduct.118  These groups have proposed federal legislation to outlaw 
revenge porn and deepfakes. 
a.  Ending Nonconsensual Online User Graphic Harassment Act of 2017:  
The ENOUGH Act 
In 2016, Congresswoman Jackie Speier (D-CA) introduced the Intimate 
Privacy Protection Act119 (IPPA), which would criminalize the distribution 
of nonconsensual pornography.120  Upon introduction of the bill, Speier 
reflected that the IPPA was a response to the fact that most revenge porn 
victims do not have the resources to seek civil remedies, and thus 
 
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/Nonconsensual_Image_Sharing_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Q6KG-F5P6]. 
 115. Peter Sherlock, Revenge Pornography Victims as Young as 11, Investigation Finds, 
BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-36054273 [https:// 
perma.cc/S339-LKSR]. 
 116. See Brady, supra note 107, at 3; see also Meghan Fay, Note, The Naked Truth:  
Insufficient Coverage for Revenge Porn Victims at State Law and the Proposed Federal 
Legislations to Adequately Redress Them, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1839, 1839 (2018). 
 117. CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/ [https://perma.cc/Z5SF-
9F6D] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019); see also Holly Jacobs, This Is What It Is Like to Be the 
Victim of Revenge Porn, and Why We Need to Criminalise It, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 13, 2015, 
4:40 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/this-is-what-it-is-like-to-be-the-
victim-of-revenge-porn-and-why-we-need-to-criminalise-it-10045067.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y9WV-PW66]. 
 118. Advocacy, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/advocacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/TG74-AML3] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 119. Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 120. As introduced, H.R. 5896 provided: 
Whoever knowingly uses the mail, any interactive computer service or electronic 
communication service or electronic communication system of interstate commerce, 
or any other facility of interstate or foreign commerce to distribute a visual depiction 
of a person who is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in 
connection with the image and who is engaging in sexually explicit conduct, or of 
the naked genitals or post-pubescent female nipple of the person, with reckless 
disregard for the person’s lack of consent to the distribution, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
Id. § 1802(a).  The legislation provided exceptions to the use of such images by law 
enforcement, in legal proceedings, and in other cases of bona fide public interest or where the 
depiction was done voluntarily in a public place or in a lawful commercial setting.  It 
specifically exempted telecommunication and internet service providers, as defined by section 
230, from prosecution, unless the provider “promotes or solicits content that it knows to be in 
violation of this section.” Id. § 1802(b)(4). 
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criminalizing revenge porn at the federal level would provide some 
redress.121  The bill expired at the end of the 114th Congress. 
After that, the bill was revised122 and introduced in late 2017 in both the 
Senate and House as the Ending Nonconsensual Online User Graphic 
Harassment Act of 2017123 (the “ENOUGH Act”).  The Act would have 
amended title 18 of the U.S. Code to make it 
unlawful to knowingly use any means or facility of interstate or foreign 
commerce to distribute an intimate visual depiction of an individual— 
“(1) with knowledge of or reckless disregard for— 
“(A) the lack of consent of the individual to the distribution;  
“(B) the reasonable expectation of the individual that the depiction 
would remain private; and 
“(C) harm that the distribution could cause to the individual; and 
“(2) without an objectively reasonable belief that such distribution 
touches upon a matter of public concern.124 
The ENOUGH Act defined “intimate visual depiction” as “any visual 
depiction” 
“(A) of an individual who is reasonably identifiable from the visual 
depiction itself or information displayed in connection with the visual 
depiction; 
“(B) in which— 
“(i) the individual is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or 
“(ii) the naked genitals or post-pubescent female nipple of the 
individual are visible; 
 
 121. Press Release, Congresswoman Jackie Speier, Congresswoman Speier, Fellow 
Members of Congress Take on Nonconsensual Pornography, AKA Revenge Porn (July 14, 
2016), https://speier.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congresswoman-speier-fellow-
members-congress-take-nonconsensual [https://perma.cc/ZE25-WQST]; see also Steven 
Nelson, Federal ‘Revenge Porn’ Bill Will Seek to Shrivel Booming Internet Fad, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:01 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/03/ 
26/federal-revenge-porn-bill-will-seek-to-shrivel-booming-internet-fad [https://perma.cc/ 
86UZ-LCNQ] (discussing Speier’s prior effort to introduce the legislation in 2014). 
 122. Critics of the IPPA worried that it could encroach on bona fide journalism and limit 
journalists’ ability to publish photos or videos that were of public interest. Jessica Lahitou, 
What Is the ENOUGH Act?:  Lawmakers Are Pushing to Criminalize Revenge Porn with a 
New Bill, BUSTLE (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/what-is-the-enough-act-
lawmakers-are-pushing-to-criminalize-revenge-porn-with-a-new-bill-6337236 [https:// 
perma.cc/3ZXU-HXQD].  The ENOUGH Act addressed critics’ concerns by providing that a 
person who posts images could only be punished if “no reasonable person would consider the 
shared image to touch on a matter of public concern.” Id.  In a fact sheet provided to Bustle 
by Senator Kamala Harris’s office, the senator clarified that the bill would “narrowly establish 
criminal liability.” Id.  It also contained a specific carve-out to protect First Amendment rights. 
Id. 
 123. S. 2162, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4472, 115th Cong. (2017).  This paper will cite 
primarily to the Senate version of the bill. 
 124. S. 2162. 
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“(C) in which the content described in subparagraph (B) is not 
simulated.125 
Punishment under the Act included a fine, imprisonment of up to five years, 
or both.126  The ENOUGH Act provided exceptions for law enforcement, 
legal proceedings, and “information content providers” as defined by 47 
U.S.C. § 230(f) “unless the provider of the communications service 
intentionally solicits, or knowingly and predominantly distributes, content 
that the provider of the communications service has actual knowledge is in 
violation of this section.”127  Although the ENOUGH Act had both 
Republican and Democratic sponsors, it never made it out of committee and 
expired at the end of the 115th Congress.128 
b.  The Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018 
In late December 2018, Senator Ben Sasse (R-NE) introduced a bill to 
criminalize the malicious creation and distribution of deepfakes, the 
Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018129 (MDFPA).  The MDFPA 
prohibited using any means or facility of interstate commerce to 
“(1) create, with the intent to distribute, a deep fake with the intent that 
the distribution of the deep fake would facilitate criminal or tortious 
conduct under Federal, State, local, or Tribal law; or 
“(2) distribute an audiovisual record with— 
“(A) actual knowledge that the audiovisual record is a deep fake; 
and 
“(B) the intent that the distribution of the audiovisual record would 
facilitate criminal or tortious conduct under Federal, State, local, or 
Tribal law.130 
The MDFPA defines “deep fake” as “an audiovisual record created or 
altered in a manner that the record would falsely appear to a reasonable 
observer to be an authentic record of the actual speech or conduct of an 
individual.”131  It would have applied to an individual deepfake creator who 
intended to do something illegal (like committing fraud) by posting the 
deepfake to a platform like Facebook—but it would only implicate Facebook 
if the platform knew it had distributed a deepfake.  The Act proposed as a 
punishment a fine and up to two years’ imprisonment, or—if the deepfake 
could facilitate violence or disrupt government or an election—up to ten 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See US S2162, BILL TRACK 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/BillDetail/897787 
[https://perma.cc/FX4S-GPK5] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 129. S. 3805, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  Under the MDFPA, “the term ‘audiovisual record’—(A) means any audio or 
visual media in an electronic format; and (B) includes any photograph, motion-picture film, 
video recording, electronic image, or sound recording.” Id. 
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years.132  Senator Sasse introduced the MDFPA the day before the December 
2018 government shutdown; the bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and expired at the end of 2018.133  It had no cosponsors.134 
B.  State Law 
No state currently criminalizes deepfakes.  As in the federal arena, victims 
of pornographic deepfakes who want to seek redress under state law must 
look to laws that criminalize related crimes, such as revenge porn.  In the 
absence of federal laws outlawing nonconsensual pornography, victims are 
left with a “patchwork of state criminal laws [that] is often inadequate.”135  
State laws range from prosecuting a revenge porn offense as a felony to 
punishing the same case as a misdemeanor to lacking felony or misdemeanor 
charges for the conduct entirely.136  This Part examines California, Texas, 
Florida, and New York—the states with the highest number of cybercrime 
complaints137 and the largest populations.138 
1.  California 
a.  Revenge Porn 
In 2013, the California State Legislature responded to the revenge porn 
epidemic by amending the existing criminal statute prohibiting disorderly 
conduct.139  Effective October 1, 2013, this amendment to section 647 of the 
Penal Code of California criminalized nonconsensual pornography by 
providing that the following persons are guilty of disorderly conduct: 
A person who intentionally distributes the image of the intimate body 
part or parts of another identifiable person, or an image of the person 
depicted engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, 
sexual penetration, or an image of masturbation by the person depicted or 
in which the person depicted participates, under circumstances in which the 
persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private, the person 
distributing the image knows or should know that distribution of the image 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. See US S3805, BILL TRACK 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/BillDetail/1000397 
[https://perma.cc/2HEQ-4WYU] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Brady, supra note 107, at 3. 
 136. See Jillian Roffer, Note, Nonconsensual Pornography:  An Old Crime Updates Its 
Software, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 935, 956–57 (2017) (summarizing 
various state law approaches to criminalizing revenge porn).  According to the Cyber Civil 
Rights Initiative, forty-one states now have laws criminalizing revenge porn. CYBER C.R. 
INITIATIVE, supra note 117. 
 137. See generally FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2017 INTERNET CRIME REPORT (2017), 
https://pdf.ic3.gov/2017_IC3Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2S8-8RRE]. 
 138. US States—Ranked by Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV., 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/ [https://perma.cc/FSA7-NGAR] (last visited Nov. 
12, 2019). 
 139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2019). 
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will cause serious emotional distress, and the person depicted suffers that 
distress.140 
Accordingly, a person intentionally distributing pornographic materials of 
an identifiable victim without the victim’s permission is guilty of disorderly 
conduct if they know, or reasonably should know, that the action will cause 
serious emotional distress, and the victim suffers such distress.141  A person 
convicted under this statute will be guilty of disorderly conduct, a 
misdemeanor.142  Maximum penalties for a violation of this section include 
up to six months in county jail, a fine of up to $1000, or both.143  This penalty 
increases for subsequent violations or if the initial violation includes a victim 
who was a minor at the time.144 
b.  Cyberstalking 
Despite being the first state to criminalize stalking,145 California does not 
have a specific cyberstalking statute and rather opts to make amendments to 
the existing stalking laws to cover cyberstalking cases.146  Under California 
Penal Code section 646.9, the general anti-stalking statute, it is unlawful to 
“willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[] or willfully and maliciously 
harass[] another person” and to “make[] a credible threat with the intent to 
place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his 
or her immediate family.”147  A stalking conviction thus requires not only 
evidence of following or harassment but also evidence of a willful and 
credible threat.148  The statute covers threats made “through the use of an 
electronic communication device,” including a cell phone and computer.149  
Stalking is a “wobbler” in California; it may be prosecuted as either a 
misdemeanor or a felony, depending on the facts of the case.150 
California passed section 653.2 of its penal code in 2009 to eliminate “an 
electronic loophole” in section 646.9 and to give “law enforcement the ability 
to hold accountable those who would prey on victims using electronic 
means.”151  This narrow statute supplements the anti-stalking law and 
provides that 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. § 647. 
 143. Id. § 19. 
 144. Id. § 647(l)(1)–(2). 
 145. Tracey B. Carter, Local, State, and Federal Responses to Stalking:  Are Anti-Stalking 
Laws Effective?, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 333, 358 (2016). 
 146. PENAL § 646.9. 
 147. Id. § 646.9(a). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. § 646.9(g)–(h). 
 150. Id. § 646.9(a)–(c) (providing that the violation of a restraining order or repeat offenses 
must be charged as a felony). 
 151. Atticus N. Wegman, Cyberbullying and California’s Response, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 737, 
741 (2013). 
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[e]very person who, with intent to place another person in reasonable 
fear for his or her safety, or the safety of the other person’s immediate 
family, by means of an electronic communication device, and without 
consent of the other person, and for the purpose of imminently causing that 
other person unwanted physical contact, injury, or harassment, by a third 
party, electronically distributes, publishes, e-mails, hyperlinks, or makes 
available for downloading, personal identifying information, including, but 
not limited to, a digital image of another person, or an electronic message 
of a harassing nature about another person, which would be likely to incite 
or produce that unlawful action, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by 
up to one year in a county jail, by a fine of not more than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.152 
The inclusion of the phrase “a digital image of another person” could be 
promising for future prosecutions of revenge porn or deepfake cases. 
c.  Other Relevant Criminal Laws 
Although the California Penal Code includes a chapter about false 
personation,153 impersonation—digital or otherwise—is not in and of itself a 
crime in California.154  For example, section 528.5 of the California Penal 
Code makes it unlawful to “knowingly and without consent credibly 
impersonate[] another actual person through or on an Internet Web site, or 
by other electronic means, for purposes of . . . defrauding another 
person.”155  This cyberimpersonation crime is a misdemeanor, punishable by 
up to one year in county jail, a fine of up to $1000, or both.156  Similarly, 
California Penal Code section 529 is a more general personation statute that 
makes it a crime to “falsely personate[] another.”157  Section 529, however, 
still applies if, while “in that assumed character,” the impersonator 
undertakes enumerated fraudulent acts.158  Finally, this personation chapter 
of the California Penal Code criminalizes identity theft.159  Per section 530.5, 
identity theft involves the willful taking of another person’s “identifying 
information” and the use of that information for “any unlawful purpose.”160 
 
 152. PENAL § 653.2(a). 
 153. Id. § 528. 
 154. In addition to the crimes identified here, the Office of the Attorney General catalogues 
other cybercrimes. See Cyber Exploitation FAQs, supra note 44. 
 155. PENAL § 528.5(a) (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. § 528.5(d). 
 157. Id. § 529. 
 158. Id. § 529(a).  Illegal acts include those in which the impersonator:  (1) “[b]ecomes bail 
or surety . . . ,” (2) signs or verifies “any written instrument, with intent that [it] . . . be 
recorded, delivered, or used as true,” or (3) subjects the person falsely impersonated to liability 
or penalty or accrues a benefit. Id.  False personation is a “wobbler,” which is “[a] crime that 
can be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor.” Wobbler, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019).  As a wobbler, it is punishable by up to one year in county jail, a fine of up to 
$10,000, or both. PENAL § 529(b). 
 159. Id. § 530.5. 
 160. Id. § 530.5(a).  Identity theft is a wobbler, chargeable as a misdemeanor or felony 
depending on the facts of the case. Id. § 529(b). 
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d.  Proposed Deepfake Legislation 
In an effort to address the problem of deepfakes, the California legislature 
has quickly introduced bills over the last year that apply criminal and civil 
penalties to the phenomenon. 
The first proposal, Assembly Bill 602, was supported by the Screen Actors 
Guild.161  As originally drafted, it would have established misdemeanor 
liability for a person who creates a deceptive recording with the intent to 
distribute it while knowing that the recording is likely to deceive a person 
who views it.162  Subsequent amendments to Assembly Bill 602 deleted the 
criminal penalties and replaced them with a civil cause of action for harm 
resulting from the intentional creation and disclosure of sexually explicit 
material without consent.163  As amended, Assembly Bill 602 provides civil 
remedies, including economic and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and 
injunctive relief.164  Assembly Bill 602 exempts from liability any person 
who discloses the material in the course of reporting unlawful activity; in the 
course of a legal proceeding; in the course of duty, when the discloser is a 
member of law enforcement; in relation to a matter of legitimate public 
concern; in a work of political or newsworthy value; or for the purposes of 
commentary or criticism.165  The bill also states that sexually explicit 
material is not newsworthy simply because the depicted individual is a public 
figure.166 
Another bill, Assembly Bill 1280, would define a “deepfake” as a 
recording that has been created or altered so that it falsely appears to be an 
authentic record of the actual speech or conduct of the individual depicted in 
the recording.167  The bill would have created a new crime when a person 
creates or distributes, without the subject’s consent, a deepfake that depicts a 
person engaging in sexual conduct.168 
 
 161. See Press Release, SAG-AFTRA, Action Alert:  Support California Bill to End 
Deepfake Porn (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.sagaftra.org/action-alert-support-california-bill-
end-deepfake-porn [https://perma.cc/WQM9-22XF]; California Legislation Takes First Steps 
Against Deepfakes, SAG-AFTRA (May 3, 2019), https://www.sagaftra.org/california-
legislation-takes-first-steps-against-deepfakes [https://perma.cc/Y5QB-GU4J]. 
 162. See Assemb. 602, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as introduced); Legislature 
Grapples with Three Bills to Address “Deepfake” Videos, CAL. NEWS PUBLISHERS ASS’N 
(Mar. 29, 2019), https://cnpa.com/legislature-grapples-with-three-bills-to-address-deepfake-
videos/ [https://perma.cc/88AS-ULXH]. 
 163. Cal. Assemb. 602; see also From a Field of Three, One Deepfake Bill Is Left, CAL. 
NEWS PUBLISHERS ASS’N, https://cnpa.com/from-a-field-of-three-one-deepfake-bill-is-left/ 
[https://perma.cc/4SUV-XYKF] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  A substantially similar proposal, 
Senate Bill 564, was held in the legislative committee. See S. 564, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2019). 
 164. Cal. Assemb. 602. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Assemb. 1280, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 168. Id.  Assembly Bill 1280 also would criminally prohibit a person from creating or 
distributing, without the depicted person’s consent, a deepfake with the intent that the 
deepfake coerce or deceive any voter into voting for or against a candidate or measure in an 
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By the end of the 2019 legislative session, Assembly Bill 1280 remained 
in policy committees, while Assembly Bill 602 was approved by the 
legislature and sent to the governor for his consideration.169  Each has drawn 
criticism from First Amendment advocacy groups, including the ACLU of 
California, the California News Publishers Association, and the California 
Broadcasters Association.170 
2.  Texas 
a.  Revenge Porn 
In 2015, the Texas Legislature enacted the Relationship Privacy Act of 
2015171 to target revenge porn.  Effective September 1, 2015, Texas Penal 
Code section 21.16 criminalizes the “unlawful disclosure or promotion of 
intimate visual material.”172  The statute provides that a person is guilty of 
the offense if:  (1) the disclosure or promotion is done intentionally and 
without the depicted victim’s consent, (2) the victim had a “reasonable 
expectation that the visual material would remain private,” (3) the disclosure 
causes harm to the victim, and (4) the victim’s identity is revealed “in any 
manner” by the disclosure.173  Distribution of intimate visual material is a 
“Class A” misdemeanor and is punishable by up to one year in prison, a 
$4000 fine, or both.174 
 
election that is occurring within sixty days. Id.  Another proposed bill, Assembly Bill 730, 
would specifically prohibit 
a person, committee, or other entity, within 60 days of an election at which a 
candidate for elective office will appear on the ballot, from distributing with actual 
malice materially deceptive audio or visual media of the candidate with the intent 
to injure the candidate’s reputation or to deceive a voter into voting for or against 
the candidate. 
Assemb. 730, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (emphasis added) (legislative counsel’s 
digest). 
 169. AB-602 Depiction of Individual Using Digital or Electronic Technology:  Sexually 
Explicit Material:  Cause of Action, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ 
billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB602 [https://perma.cc/5FA6-Z4HH] (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2019); AB-1280 Crimes:  Deceptive Recordings, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB1280 
[https://perma.cc/B4M6-NXNW] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 170. Ben Christopher, Can California Crack Down on Deepfakes Without Violating the 
First Amendment?, KQED NEWS (July 3, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11758994/can-
california-crack-down-on-deepfakes-without-violating-the-first-amendment 
[https://perma.cc/MA3Q-JJ7V]; Andrew Sheeler, California Is Moving to Ban Deepfakes.  
What Are They, Anyway?, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 1, 2019, 9:26 PM), https:// 
www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article232162032.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y375-9QTK]. 
 171. 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 8723–26. 
 172. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16 (West 2019). 
 173. Id. § 21.16(b). 
 174. Id. §§ 12.21, 21.16. 
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b.  Cyberstalking 
Texas has only one general anti-stalking law, which makes no explicit 
reference to cyberstalking.175  Rather, it broadly provides that an individual 
is guilty of stalking if that individual knowingly engages in a pattern of 
conduct directed at another person (or that person’s family) that harasses or 
threatens (or creates a fear of) bodily injury or death or causes the victim to 
feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or 
offended and would cause a reasonable person to similarly suffer.176 
Stalking is a felony of the third degree, punishable by at least two (and no 
more than ten) years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000.177  For 
subsequent violations, this offense increases to a felony of the second degree, 
punishable by at least two (and no more than twenty) years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of up to $10,000.178 
Although section 42.072 does not refer to electronic harassment or 
cyberstalking, a Texas appellate court has interpreted the statute to include 
electronic communications.179  Further, section 42.07, the harassment 
provision mentioned above, criminalizes “repeated electronic 
communications [sent] in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, 
abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another.”180  This underlying offense is 
itself a “Class B” misdemeanor, punishable by up to 180 days in jail, a fine 
of up to $2000, or both.181  For subsequent violations, violations involving 
minors, or violations of restraining orders, this offense increases to a “Class 
A” misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in prison, a $4000 fine, or 
both.182 
c.  Other Relevant Criminal Laws 
The Texas Legislature addressed internet harassment by enacting a 
criminal statute specifically targeting online impersonation in 2009.183  
Section 33.07 criminalizes two types of online impersonation.184  The first 
category, a felony in the third degree,185 makes it unlawful to, “without 
obtaining the other person’s consent and with the intent to harm, defraud, 
intimidate, or threaten any person,” use the name or persona of another to 
create an online web page or post or send messages through social 
networking or other internet websites, not including email or message 
 
 175. Id. § 42.072. 
 176. Id. § 42.072(a). 
 177. Id. §§ 12.34, 42.072(b). 
 178. Id. §§ 12.33, 42.072(b). 
 179. Manuel v. State, 357 S.W.3d 66, 83 (Tex. App. 2011). 
 180. PENAL § 42.07(a)(7). 
 181. Id. §§ 12.22, 42.07(c). 
 182. Id. §§ 12.21, 42.07(c). 
 183. Id. § 33.07. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. §§ 12.34, 33.07(c) (punishable by at least two and no more than ten years’ 
imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000). 
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boards.186  The second category, a “Class A” misdemeanor,187 makes it 
unlawful to send an email, instant message, text message, or other message 
referencing “a name, domain address, phone number, or other item of 
identifying information belonging to any person” without that person’s 
consent and with the intent of causing the recipient of the message to 
reasonably believe the other person sent or authorized the message and the 
intent “to harm or defraud any person.”188  The term “identifying 
information” is defined in section 32.51 as “information that alone or in 
conjunction with other information identifies a person.”189  Section 32.51 
also criminalizes fraudulent use or possession of identifying information.190 
3.  Florida 
a.  Revenge Porn 
In 2015, the Florida Legislature tackled the revenge porn problem and 
enacted a statute to criminalize “sexual cyberharassment.”191  Sexual 
cyberharassment is defined in the statute as “publish[ing] . . . a sexually 
explicit image of a person that contains or conveys the personal identification 
information of the depicted person [to a website] without the depicted 
person’s consent . . . for no legitimate purpose, with the intent of causing 
substantial emotional distress to the depicted person.”192  A person who 
“willfully and maliciously sexually cyberharasses another person” will be 
guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable by up to one year in 
prison or a fee of up to $1000.193  Subsequent offenses are charged as a felony 
of the third degree, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment or a fee of 
up to $5000.194 
b.  Cyberstalking 
Florida’s anti-stalking law has notably contained an explicit cyberstalking 
provision since July 1, 2004.195  The statutory definition of cyberstalking is 
to “engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be 
communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of 
electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person . . . 
causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no 
 
 186. Id. § 33.07(a). 
 187. Id. §§ 12.21, 33.07(c) (punishable by up to one year in prison, a $4000 fine, or both). 
 188. Id. § 33.07(b). 
 189. Id. § 32.51(a)(1) (including name and date of birth, “unique biometric data,” “unique 
electronic identification” information, “telecommunication identifying information,” and 
“social security number or other government-issued identification number”). 
 190. See generally id. § 32.51. 
 191. FLA. STAT. § 784.049 (2019). 
 192. Id. § 784.049(2)(c). 
 193. Id. § 784.049(3)(a); see also id.  §§ 775.082(4)(a), 775.083(1)(d). 
 194. Id. § 784.049(3)(b); see also id. §§ 775.082(3)(e), 775.083(1)(c). 
 195. Id. § 784.048. 
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legitimate purpose.”196  The Florida anti-stalking statute is also unique as it 
has two categories of stalking—stalking and aggravated stalking.197  A 
person who “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly” cyberstalks another is 
guilty of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree.198  Stalking is 
punishable by up to one year in prison or a fee of up to $1000.199  A person 
who “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly” cyberstalks another and either 
(1) makes a credible threat to that person, (2) violates a restraining order or 
other injunction, or (3) targets a minor under the age of sixteen is guilty of 
aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree.200  Aggravated stalking is 
punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment or a fee of up to $5000.201 
4.  New York 
a.  Revenge Porn 
New York is presently among the twelve states that have not criminalized 
revenge porn.202  Senate Bill 642 was the third iteration of the New York 
legislature’s attempt at enacting a criminal ban on nonconsensual 
pornography.203  However, any momentum behind this bill stopped after it 
passed in the Senate on March 19, 2018, and was delivered to the Assembly, 
where it subsequently expired.204 
b.  Cyberstalking 
New York’s anti-stalking scheme consists of four categories of offenses:  
stalking in the fourth degree,205 the third degree,206 the second degree,207 and 
the first degree.208  The base-level fourth-degree stalking statute does not 
 
 196. Id. § 784.048(d). 
 197. Id. § 784.048(2)–(5). 
 198. Id. § 784.048(2). 
 199. Id. §§ 775.082(4)(a), 775.083(1)(d), 784.048(2). 
 200. Id. § 784.048(3)–(5). 
 201. Id. §§ 775.082(3)(e), 775.083(1)(c), 784.048(3)–(5). 
 202. Douglas Harris, Student Article, Deepfakes:  False Pornography Is Here and the Law 
Cannot Protect You, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 99, 119 (2019) (“Thirty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia have nonconsensual pornography laws.”). 
 203. S. 642, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
 204. Senate Bill 642, N.Y. ST. SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/ 
2017/s642 [https://perma.cc/TZ2F-9ZMU] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  After the revenge 
porn bill’s demise, proponents pointed fingers at Google and other tech lobbyists. See Kirstan 
Conley & Gabrielle Fonrouge, Google Kills Revenge Porn Bill, N.Y. POST (June 21, 2018, 
2:31 AM), https://nypost.com/2018/06/21/new-yorks-revenge-porn-bill-dies-after-11th-hour-
campaign-by-google/ [https://perma.cc/8YSF-Z8V3]; James Hetherington, What Happened 
to New York’s Revenge Porn Bill?, NEWSWEEK (June 21, 2018, 1:46 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/what-happened-new-yorks-revenge-porn-bill-google-989666 
[https://perma.cc/7ZHY-C8JD]. 
 205. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (McKinney 2019) (a class B misdemeanor). 
 206. Id. § 120.50 (a class A misdemeanor). 
 207. Id. § 120.55 (a class E felony). 
 208. Id. § 120.60 (a class D felony). 
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explicitly recognize cyberstalking or online harassment.209  The higher-
degree charges increase in severity based on factors such as repeat offenses, 
the age of the victim, and the use of weapons.210 
New York also has a separate criminal statutory scheme specifically 
focused on criminal harassment.211  Notably, a person who intentionally 
“engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or 
seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose” is 
guilty of harassment in the second degree.212  However, harassment in the 
second degree is only a violation punishable by up to fifteen days’ 
imprisonment and a fine of up to $250.213  Moreover, the aggravated 
harassment in the second-degree statute specifically criminalizes harassing 
electronic communication if a threat against one’s physical harm, property, 
or family is made.214  As a “class A” misdemeanor, aggravated harassment 
in the second degree is punishable by up to one year in prison and a fine of 
up to $1000.215 
c.  Other Relevant Criminal Laws 
Similar to the California framework, online impersonation is only criminal 
under New York Penal Law section 190.25 when it is done in conjunction 
with one of the specific purposes delineated in the statute.216  Section 190.25 
explicitly provides that a person who “[i]mpersonates another by 
communication by internet website or electronic means” is guilty of criminal 
impersonation in the second degree if the impersonation is done with the 
“intent to obtain a benefit or injure or defraud another.”217  As a “class A” 
misdemeanor, criminal impersonation in the second degree is punishable by 
up to one year in prison and a fine of up to $1000.218 
d.  Proposed New Civil Rights 
On May 31, 2017, Assembly Bill 8155 was introduced in the New York 
State Assembly.219  This bill attempted to address the deepfake problem by 
creating new civil rights and civil remedies 
[e]stablish[ing] the right of privacy and the right of publicity for both living 
and deceased individuals; provid[ing] that an individual’s persona is the 
personal property of the individual and is freely transferable and 
 
 209. Id. § 120.45 (referencing only telephonic communication and the use of global 
positioning systems to track a person’s location). 
 210. Id. §§ 120.50, 120.55, 120.60. 
 211. See generally id. §§ 240.25–240.32. 
 212. Id. § 240.26(3). 
 213. Id. §§ 70.15(4), 80.05(4), 240.26. 
 214. Id. § 240.30(1). 
 215. Id. §§ 70.15(1), 80.05(1), 240.30. 
 216. See id. § 190.25. 
 217. Id. § 190.25(4). 
 218. Id. §§ 70.15(1), 80.05(1), 190.25. 
 219. Assemb. 8155, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
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descendible; provid[ing] for the registration with the department of state of 
such rights of a deceased individual; and that the use of a digital replica for 
purposes of trade within an expressive work shall be a violation.220 
The bill passed the Assembly and was delivered to the New York State 
Senate on June 18, 2018.221  The breadth of the initial law drew strong 
criticism from entertainment companies, including Disney, NBCUniversal, 
and the Motion Picture Association of America.222 
IV.  LIMITATIONS TO CURRENT CRIMINAL LAW SOLUTIONS 
Although other laws (and proposed laws) might be used in a deepfake 
prosecution, these laws have limitations.  This Part explores shortcomings in 
the current and proposed laws in the context of deepfakes, including First 
Amendment concerns. 
A.  Problems with Current Laws and Proposed Legislation 
1.  Inadequacies of Current Federal and State Criminal Laws on 
Cybercrime, Stalking, Criminal Threats, and Harassment 
As the revenge porn phenomenon emerged, victims, their advocates, and 
legal scholars were quick to point out that existing criminal laws—both 
federal and state—were insufficient to punish the creators and distributors 
and to remedy the harms victims suffered.223  These inadequacies persist in 
the face of pornographic deepfakes, which similarly do not fit within current 
criminal statutory schemes, even those that criminalize revenge porn.  A brief 
survey of stalking, criminal threats, and harassment statutes illustrates how 
current laws do not address the problems affiliated with nonconsensual 
pornography, be it revenge porn or pornographic deepfakes. 
The federal cyberstalking statute224 and the anti-stalking statutes of many 
states, such as California225 and Texas,226 include a specific fear requirement.  
To be found guilty, the accused must have intentionally or recklessly 
(depending on the jurisdiction) threatened the victim or acted in a way that 
 
 220. Assembly Bill A8155B, N.Y. ST. SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/ 
2017/a8155 [https://perma.cc/Y9PF-8PZR] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) (summarizing the 
bill). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Katyanna Quach, New York State Is Trying to Ban ‘Deepfakes’ and Hollywood Isn’t 
Happy, REGISTER (June 12, 2018, 10:22 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/06/12/ 
new_york_state_is_trying_to_ban_deepfakes_and_hollywood_isnt_happy/ [https://perma.cc/ 
33HL-8X2P]; see also Memorandum from the Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. (June 8, 
2018), https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/mpaa_opposition_ 
to_a8155b.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6DV-TF4H]; Letter from Lisa Pitney, Vice President, Walt 
Disney Co., to Senator Martin Golden (June 8, 2018), https://www.rightofpublicity 
roadmap.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/disney_opposition_letters_a8155b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TBL6-V5U5]. 
 223. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 107, at 12; Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 365. 
 224. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012). 
 225. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2019). 
 226. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072 (West 2019). 
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made the victim fear bodily harm or death for themselves or their families.227  
Similarly, other statutes include an element requiring proof of the victim’s 
“emotional distress.”228  The laws that proscribe “criminal threats” may also 
fail to address deepfakes because criminal threat statutes require proof of a 
communication of a threat to kidnap or injure the victim.229  Even though 
deepfakes may injure victims, they do not necessarily constitute a threat of 
injury.  And although many victims of nonconsensual pornography suffer 
from emotional distress230 and genuinely fear for their safety, especially 
where their personal information is also shared,231 these subjective elements 
can be difficult, if not impossible, to prove at trial. 
Further, these requirements trivialize the harm inherent in nonconsensual 
pornography.  By requiring prosecutors to prove these subjective elements, 
the message is that the public display of victims’ bodies engaged in revealing 
or sexually explicit behavior without their consent is insufficient, standing 
alone, to warrant the law’s attention.232  Moreover, many stalking and 
harassment statutes, such as those of Texas233 and Florida,234 require a 
pattern, course of conduct, or multiple incidents.235  Thus, a single posting, 
even if it goes viral, would not qualify as a crime under these legal 
frameworks.236 
Impersonation laws similarly fail to address many nonconsensual 
pornography scenarios.  As an initial matter, these laws apply where the 
depiction at issue was shared or posted in a way that made it seem like the 
victim was the poster.237  Clearly, this is not always the case, especially with 
 
 227. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1)(A) (applying to conduct that “places [a] person in 
reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to (i) that person, (ii) an immediate 
family member . . . of that person, or (iii) a spouse or intimate partner of that person”), with 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072 (West 2019) (prohibiting threats of “(A) bodily injury or 
death for the other person; (B) bodily injury or death for a member of the other person’s family 
or household or for an individual with whom the other person has a dating relationship; or (C) 
that an offense will be committed against the other person’s property”). 
 228. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 784.048(1)(d) (2019). 
 229. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
 230. Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 351 (reporting that “80% of revenge porn victims 
experience severe emotional distress and anxiety”). 
 231. Id. at 350–51 (“Nonconsensual pornography raises the risk of offline stalking and 
physical attack.  In a study of 1,244 individuals, over 50% of victims reported that their naked 
photos appeared next to their full name and social network profile; over 20% of victims 
reported that their e-mail addresses and telephone numbers appeared next to their naked 
photos.”). 
 232. See id. at 350–54 (explaining the damage to victims of revenge porn). 
 233. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072 (West 2019). 
 234. FLA. STAT. § 784.048(1)(d) (2019). 
 235. See Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 350–54 (describing revenge porn’s damage). 
 236. See Linkous, supra note 86, at 24–25. 
 237. See Allison Greene, Note, The Ill of Misogyny on the Internet:  Why Revenge Porn 
Needs Federal Criminalization, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 175, 194 (2017) (discussing the 
intersections between impersonation crimes and revenge porn); see also Snehal Desai, Note, 
Smile for the Camera:  The Revenge Pornography Dilemma, California’s Approach, and Its 
Constitutionality, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 443, 464 (2015) (“[I]f a perpetrator simply posts 
a picture online without impersonating the victim or giving out her information, he could avoid 
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regard to deepfakes which gained initial popularity on Reddit with depictions 
of celebrities in pornographic videos.238  Further, in situations where there is 
an element of impersonation, as seen in the state impersonation laws 
discussed above,239 online or digital impersonation is not inherently criminal; 
it is the use of impersonation to perform an unlawful task, such as defrauding 
a third party or creating liability for the impersonated individual, that is 
criminalized.240  These laws will do little to protect victims of nonconsensual 
pornography because there is rarely a secondary criminal intent behind the 
posting or sharing of revenge porn or deepfakes. 
Identity theft can be a promising option given the frequency with which 
personal identifying information accompanies nonconsensual pornography 
posts.241  The California case of Kevin Bollaert is illustrative.  Bollaert 
created and managed ugotposted.com, a revenge porn website, and its 
companion page, changemyreputation.com, which charged victims fees of 
$250 to $350 to have their images removed from the revenge porn page.242  
Bollaert was prosecuted and convicted of identity theft and extortion.243  
Although the website was shut down and Bollaert received an eighteen-year 
prison sentence, he notably “was not prosecuted for a crime directly related 
to revenge porn, instead he was charged for his conduct in requiring payment 
to remove the photograph.”244  Accordingly, although identity theft can be 
useful in some nonconsensual pornography cases, these laws fail to 
criminalize the underlying conduct—the posting of nonconsensual 
pornography in the first place. 
Similarly, computer crimes, such as unauthorized access or hacking,245 
apply in limited circumstances where the pornographic material or images 
used in the creation of a pornographic deepfake are obtained via unauthorized 
access to the victim’s computer or email.246  Again, while prosecution under 
these laws may result in a desirable outcome, the laws do not focus on the 
true harm of sharing revenge porn or pornographic deepfakes nor do they 
have broad applications. 
These federal and state laws might be an option to prosecute deepfakes, 
but they are not ideal—they do not expressly apply to deepfakes.  And 
regardless of the reprehensibility of the conduct, judges might be reluctant to 
stretch these laws past their plain language.  This is illustrated by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recent holding that “upskirting” is 
legal as long as the person being photographed is not nude or partially 
 
prosecution for false personation and unauthorized electronic distribution of personal 
information.”). 
 238. See Hawkins, supra note 18. 
 239. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(a) (West 2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25 (McKinney 
2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2019). 
 240. See sources cited supra note 239. 
 241. See Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 351. 
 242. People v. Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814, 819 (Ct. App. 2016). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Brady, supra note 107, at 20–21. 
 245. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 246. Groban, supra note 99, at 16. 
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nude.247  Judges’ unwillingness to broaden statutes further highlights the 
need for specific laws targeting deepfakes. 
2.  Shortcomings of Actual and Proposed Revenge Porn Laws 
Most states have adopted legislation specifically targeting revenge porn to 
address these insufficiencies.248  Those laws, often imperfect even in the 
revenge porn context, are not a fix for pornographic deepfakes. 
a.  State Statutes 
As the criminalization of revenge porn has become increasingly popular 
across the nation, these new laws have been subject to scrutiny.  Three 
common and particularly salient critiques stand out.  First, many revenge 
porn statutes, including those in California, Texas, and Florida, incorporate 
an intent requirement.249  Requiring prosecutors to prove a particular mens 
rea is difficult.250  Moreover, it “miss[es] the point”251:  the wrongdoing is 
“the disclosure of someone’s naked photographs without the person’s 
consent and in violation of their expectation that the image be kept private”; 
the motivation for doing so is irrelevant.252  A second issue is the inclusion 
of a harm requirement; many states, including California, require a showing 
that the victim suffered actual harm or emotional distress.253  This element is 
again difficult to prove in court and it “forces victims to expose even more 
of their private lives to the public.”254  Finally, the penalties affiliated with 
many revenge porn statutes are weak.255 
 
 247. See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 522, 528 (Mass. 2014) (holding that it is 
legal to secretly photograph underneath a person’s clothing when the person is not nude or 
partially nude); see also Haimy Assefa, Massachusetts Court Says ‘Upskirt’ Photos Are Legal, 
CNN (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/05/us/massachusetts-upskirt-
photography/index.html [https://perma.cc/943Q-R2EA]. 
 248. 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. 
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/V276-
JCYC] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 249. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2019); FLA. STAT. § 784.049 (2019); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16 (West 2019). 
 250. Diane Bustamante, Comment, Florida Joins the Fight Against Revenge Porn:  
Analysis of Florida’s New Anti-Revenge Porn Law, 12 FIU L. REV. 357, 387 (2017) 
(“Prosecutors have to ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant posted the photo 
to intentionally hurt the victim,’ and not because he just thought it was ‘profitable,’ ‘just for 
fun,’ to annoy, or any other reason the offender can come up with.” (quoting Haley Fox, Why 
Revenge Porn Laws May Not Protect Women, TAKEPART (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.takepart.com/article/2014/12/02/revenge-porn-protections/ 
[https://perma.cc/V6ZZ-Z8V4])). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 387. 
 253. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2019). 
 254. Christian Nisttáhuz, Comment, Fifty States of Gray:  A Comparative Analysis of 
“Revenge-Porn” Legislation Throughout the United States and Texas’s Relationship Privacy 
Act, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 333, 358 (2018). 
 255. The statutes in California, Florida, and Texas all qualify first-time offenses without 
any aggravating circumstances as mere misdemeanors, with punishments ranging from just 
six months to a year in prison and $1000 to $4000 fines. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4), (l) 
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b.  The ENOUGH Act 
Beyond these critiques, revenge porn laws—both current state laws and 
the proposed federal ENOUGH Act—will not assist in the case of deepfakes 
for four key reasons. 
First, the ENOUGH Act, like the laws enacted by many states including 
California, Texas, and Florida,256 requires that there be a victim who (1) is 
either engaged in sexually explicit conduct or whose intimate body parts are 
exposed, and (2) is identifiable to some degree in the visual depiction.257  
These are problematic requirements for deepfake cases because victims are 
not easily identifiable and because revenge porn inherently creates two 
victims, not one.  The victim whose face is shown will likely be more readily 
identified, but it is the other victim whose intimate body parts are exposed.  
Both individuals are indeed victims, yet revenge porn laws do not completely 
cover either.258 
A second issue is that of consent.  The ENOUGH Act and state revenge 
porn laws require that the sharing or posting be done without the victim’s 
consent.259  In a typical revenge porn scenario, the victim often initially 
consents to the creation of the image or visual within the context of a specific 
relationship.  The issue then arises when the image or visual is exposed in 
another context, one in which the victim did not provide consent.260  Consent 
is even more amorphous when it comes to deepfakes.  Whose consent is 
required?  The victim whose body is shown or the victim whose face is shown 
or both?  What would consent cover:  the creation or distribution of the 
deepfake?  The specific use of their image or likeness?  The underlying 
videos or images used to create the deepfake?  The victim whose body is 
displayed may have consented to the creation and distribution of the original, 
underlying video or image; however, they most likely did not consent to the 
superimposition of another person’s face onto their body.  Similarly, the 
victim whose face is shown likely consented to the underlying photographs 
or videos in one context, perhaps as a post on social media, but not for the 
use in a deepfake. 
Third, the ENOUGH Act and the laws of states like Texas and California 
require that the victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the 
depiction.261  Again, this element is relatively straightforward in a typical 
revenge porn context where one partner in a relationship shared an intimate 
image with the other, operating under the assumption that the image would 
 
(West 2019); FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(4)(a), 775.083(1)(d), 784.049(3)(a) (2019); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. §§ 12.21, 21.16 (West 2019). 
 256. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2019); FLA. STAT. § 784.049 (2019); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16 (West 2019). 
 257. See S. 2162, 115th Cong. (2017).  The ENOUGH Act also shares similarities with 
some revenge porn state statutes.  As in some states, the ENOUGH Act does not include a 
harm requirement but does have an intent requirement. Id. 
 258. See Harris, supra note 202, at 122. 
 259. See sources cited supra note 256. 
 260. See Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 345–48. 
 261. S. 2162; see supra Part III.B. 
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not be shared outside the relationship.  In the deepfake context, this element 
does not exist and cannot be shown; neither victim would ever have an 
expectation of privacy in the deepfake. 
Fourth, the ENOUGH Act excluded simulated acts from the definition of 
“intimate visual depiction.”262  This provision directly contradicted the Act’s 
incorporation of the definition of “sexually explicit conduct” set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 2256, which includes simulated conduct.263  This provision would 
presumably preclude criminal liability for deepfakes, which are necessarily 
simulated because they are fake. 
In sum, because identification of victims, initial consent, and expectation 
of privacy are all either implicit or explicit elements of the existing statutes 
criminalizing revenge porn, and because these elements either are 
nonexistent (in the case of privacy or consent) or would not be easily proven 
(in the case of identification of all victims), existing and proposed revenge 
porn laws cannot be used to prosecute deepfakes.  New legislation focused 
on deepfakes is warranted. 
3.  Shortcomings of the Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018 
Although pornographic deepfakes must be criminalized, the Malicious 
Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018 is an inadequate solution.  As an initial 
matter, the MDFPA is overbroad in many respects.  First, the MDFPA’s 
definition of a “deepfake” is extremely broad, including any “audiovisual 
record created or altered in a manner that the record would falsely appear to 
a reasonable observer to be an authentic record of the actual speech or 
conduct of an individual.”264  This definition, without any limitations or 
modifiers, casts too broad a net; it seemingly encompasses a wide range of 
media, including legitimate, nonoffensive content like computer-generated 
imagery in films.  To counteract this broad definition, the MDFPA includes 
an equally overbroad exemption for First Amendment speech.265  As written, 
the MDFPA would allow nearly every deepfake to be subject to a parody or 
satire defense.  Moreover, the liability placed on distributors is overly 
expansive and runs the risk of sparking a reactive sweep of potentially 
problematic content without giving careful consideration to legitimate 
content.266 
 
 262. S. 2162. 
 263. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2012) (“‘[S]exually explicit conduct’ means actual or simulated—
(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, 
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; . . . or (v) lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of any person . . . .”). 
 264. S. 3805, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 265. Id. (“No person shall be held liable under this section for any activity protected by the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). 
 266. See Kaveh Waddell, Lawmakers Plunge into “Deepfake” War, AXIOS (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.axios.com/deepfake-laws-fb5de200-1bfe-4aaf-9c93-19c0ba16d744.html 
[https://perma.cc/KRH5-ZRWE] (“Danielle Citron, a University of Maryland law professor 
and co-author of a landmark law article on deepfakes, says the bill places over-broad liability 
on distributors.  She says it could scare platforms into immediately taking down everything 
that’s reported as a deepfake—potentially deleting legitimate posts in the process.”). 
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Further, the MDFPA only criminalizes deepfakes created with the 
intention that the distribution would “facilitate criminal or tortious 
conduct.”267  In other words, under the MDFPA, conduct is only criminal if 
the distribution is done with the intent to violate some other criminal or tort 
law.  By conditioning criminal sanctions for deepfakes on proof that the 
creator or distributor violated another law, the MDFPA is both under-268 and 
overinclusive269 and adds a layer of complication to the prosecutor’s job.  At 
the same time, as illustrated above, the law does not adequately protect 
victims of nonconsensual pornography.  Thus, the MDFPA may fail to 
criminalize pornographic deepfakes where no secondary criminal or tortious 
conduct exists.  The creation or distribution of a pornographic deepfake, 
standing alone, deserves criminal punishment without requiring intent to 
violate another law. 
Furthermore, the MDFPA was not written with the goal of protecting 
pornographic deepfake victims in mind.  It focuses on the implications of 
politicized deepfakes.270  Election tampering, fake news, and other perceived 
harms to democratic institutions rightly deserve attention; these concerns, 
however, also draw more political concern and resources.  Conversely, the 
victims of nonconsensual pornographic, including deepfakes, have not been 
afforded the same concern or given the same priority.271  Although 
pornographic deepfakes involving celebrities first drew attention to this new 
technology, its potential victims are not just the Scarlett Johanssons of the 
world.272  Historically, the law, law enforcement, and even society have 
 
 267. S. 3805. 
 268. Under the MDFPA, a creator or distributor of a pornographic deepfake would escape 
federal criminal liability under the proposed statute where, irrespective of the harm caused by 
the conduct, it does not violate another law. Id.  Given the inadequacy of current civil remedies 
and criminal law to address deepfakes and similar forms of nonconsensual pornography and 
the challenges of proof where such remedies exist, the likelihood of a successful prosecution 
under the MDFPA for pornographic deepfakes is slim. 
 269. Under the MDFPA, seemingly harmless deepfakes could ensnare their creators and 
distributors in criminal liability where the conduct violates another statute. See Orin S. Kerr, 
Should Congress Pass a “Deep Fakes” Law?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 31, 2019, 6:05 PM), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2019/01/31/should-congress-pass-a-deep-fakes-law 
[https://perma.cc/6M8U-G7MA] (“Consider an example of how the broad language might 
work with Senator Sasse’s bill.  Imagine Sally creates a deepfake in which she imposes her 
own face on a video clip of President Trump at a political rally.  Sally thinks her clip is 
hilarious, as it really looks like Sally is President.  The video is so funny that Sally wants to 
show it to her friends.  She decides to throw a party with a live band at which she will hand 
out copies of her hilarious deepfakes video.  The live band is very loud, however.  It’s so loud 
that the party is tortious under state law, as it’s a private nuisance to her neighbors.”). 
 270. See Ben Sasse, This New Technology Could Send American Politics into a Tailspin, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2018, 5:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-real-
scary-news-about-deepfakes/2018/10/19/6238c3ce-d176-11e8-83d6-291fcead2ab1_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/SL33-27K8]. 
 271. See Citron, supra note 92, at 402–04. 
 272. Sean Hollister, Scarlett Johansson Slams Deepfakes, Says She Can’t Stop the Internet 
from Pasting Her Face on Porn, VERGE (Dec. 31, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2018/12/31/18163351/scarlett-johansson-slams-deepfakes-internet-lost-cause [https:// 
perma.cc/SMK2-3H3P]. 
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failed to prioritize and protect the victims of nonconsensual pornography.273  
Thus, just as revenge porn prompted the development of its own set of laws, 
pornographic deepfakes need to be addressed through a separate criminal 
statute. 
B.  First Amendment Concerns 
Immediately after celebrity-based pornographic deepfakes emerged in late 
2017 and went viral on the internet, legal scholars and journalists raised the 
alarm that this conduct implicated the First Amendment protections afforded 
to online content.274  Speech and expressive conduct reflexively obtain First 
Amendment free speech protection; the government may not “restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”275  Speech that is merely offensive or distasteful is nonetheless 
protected as a free expression as well.276 
Similarly, attempts to criminalize revenge porn across the states and at the 
federal level have been met with First Amendment challenges and 
concerns.277  Thus, to survive constitutional challenge, legislation targeting 
revenge porn has been narrowly tailored to avoid encompassing legitimate 
and protected, albeit objectionable, speech.278 
The same concerns appear in the deepfake context.279  Indeed, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has explicitly held that false speech is protected under the 
First Amendment.280  Further, given the digitalized nature of deepfakes, there 
is an added layer of concern about parody and satire.  These apprehensions 
are legitimate, and deepfake legislation must recognize the risk posed by 
content-based restrictions.  However, there are ways to consider First 
Amendment free speech concerns while also safeguarding victims of 
nonconsensual pornography, such as deepfakes.281 
 
 273. See Citron, supra note 92, at 402–04. 
 274. Farokhmanesh, supra note 61 (“Getting the content removed could be a possible First 
Amendment violation.  ‘All content is presumptively protected by the First Amendment,’ [law 
professor Eric] Goldman says.”). 
 275. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 
U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). 
 276. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The hallmark of the protection of free 
speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people 
might find distasteful or discomforting.” (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”). 
 277. See Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 374–77. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 31–33). 
 280. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721–22. 
 281. Criminal laws are often used to protect privacy, including criminal laws against 
unauthorized disclosures of private financial or medical information as well as laws against 
trespass and voyeurism. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1801 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012).  If 
criminal laws protecting financial, medical, and other forms of privacy can be compatible with 
the First Amendment, criminal laws protecting pornographic deepfakes should be as well. 
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One solution is to include an explicit public interest exception in a statute 
criminalizing pornographic deepfakes.282  Several states have included 
provisions “guard[ing] against the criminalization of disclosures concerning 
matters of public interest” in their anti–revenge porn laws.283  Allowing for 
the distribution of deepfakes or revenge porn that would otherwise be 
criminalized when it pertains to a legitimate matter of public concern can 
alleviate First Amendment issues.284 
Another option is to draft legislation that defines and characterizes 
deepfakes as unprotected speech—namely, in this context, obscenity.285  The 
Supreme Court has firmly established that obscene material is not protected 
under the First Amendment.286  The test to determine whether the content is 
obscene is: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.287 
The Court in Miller v. California288 even provided examples of regulable 
obscenity, such as “[p]atently offensive representations or descriptions of 
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated” or “[p]atently 
offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory 
functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.”289  Thus, a law targeted at 
pornographic deepfakes could likely survive a First Amendment challenge if 
the regulated content is defined within the constraints of obscenity. 
V.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
This Part focuses on potential solutions to the problem of pornographic 
deepfakes, both legal and extralegal.  Deepfakes, like revenge porn, inflict 
the harm of sexual objectification without consent.  They violate a person’s 
“expectation that all aspects of sexual activity should be founded on 
consent.”290  Thus, victims of pornographic deepfakes, like victims of 
revenge porn, need concrete solutions for holding creators of content liable, 
policing distributors, and removing offensive content from the internet.  
There is a clear need for federal criminal law to provide solutions for victims. 
 
 282. See Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 388. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See id. at 384–85. 
 286. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
 287. Id. at 24 (citation omitted) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). 
 288. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 289. Id. at 25. 
 290. See Dodge & Johnstone, supra note 13, at 4. 
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A.  Criminalization Through Federal Law Rather Than State Law 
A federal law criminalizing pornographic deepfakes would provide a 
strong and effective disincentive to their creation and distribution.291  The 
slow, uneven efforts to criminalize revenge porn at the state level over the 
last decade292 demonstrate that waiting for the states to outlaw deepfakes will 
take too long as the technology becomes more sophisticated and more 
accessible.293  Federal criminalization of deepfakes is warranted for several 
reasons.  First, internet activities cross jurisdictional boundaries and involve 
interstate and international communications; because they appear on the 
internet, deepfakes are not a local crime confined to a single state or local 
jurisdiction.  A deepfake creator may reside in one state, while the creator’s 
victims live in another and the deepfake may be disseminated on the internet.  
Thus, a pornographic deepfake, like any other internet crime, is by its nature 
an offense that is beyond the jurisdictional limits of any single state.294 
Second, because creating pornographic deepfakes is a crime lacking 
jurisdictional boundaries, criminalization should be national, uniform, and 
consistent everywhere—the punishment imposed and remedies provided 
should not depend on the state in which the victims or perpetrators reside.  A 
federal criminal statute would ensure that victims are protected in states that 
refuse to act or are slow to do so.  Moreover, victims may have trouble 
persuading state law enforcement to help them if, for example, the deepfake 
creator resides in another jurisdiction, especially one that does not 
criminalize the activity.  In that instance, federal criminal law would ensure 
that authorities understand that this behavior is against the law and deserves 
attention. 
Third, federal law is necessary because state laws are constrained by 
section 230 of the CDA, which impedes state actions against website 
operators who host nonconsensual pornography; the immunity that section 
230 provides for internet service providers and other content distributors does 
not apply to violations of federal criminal law.295  Fourth, criminalizing 
 
 291. As Mary Anne Franks and Danielle Keats Citron have observed in encouraging the 
criminalization of revenge porn, “[n]onconsensual pornography’s rise is surely related to the 
fact that malicious actors have little incentive to refrain from such behavior.” See Citron & 
Franks, supra note 41, at 361. 
 292. See Linkous, supra note 86, at 36–37 (urging the federal criminalization of revenge 
porn). 
 293. See Bloomberg, How Faking Videos Became Easy—and Why That’s so Scary, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 11, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/09/11/deep-fakes-obama-video/ 
[https://perma.cc/64MB-JGG9]; Donie O’Sullivan et al., When Seeing Is No Longer 
Believing:  Inside the Pentagon’s Race Against Deepfake Videos, CNN BUS., https:// 
www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/01/business/pentagons-race-against-deepfakes/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6ASD-WK3Y] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  
 294. See Robert L. Ullmann & David L. Ferrera, Crime on the Internet, BOS. B.J., 
Nov./Dec. 1998, at 4, 4 (stating that most internet crime involves interstate or international 
communications); Anne E. Hawley, Comment, Taking Spam out of Your Cyberspace Diet:  
Common Law Applied to Bulk Unsolicited Advertising via Electronic Mail, 66 UMKC L. REV. 
381, 385 (1997) (discussing the inadequacy of state legislation in controlling spam because 
internet activities cross jurisdictional boundaries). 
 295. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012). 
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pornographic deepfakes as a federal crime brings to bear the greater resources 
of the federal government, including the prosecutorial power of the 
Department of Justice and the investigative expertise of the FBI. 
Finally, criminalizing deepfakes at the federal level adds gravitas to the 
situation and shines a spotlight on its harms—it demonstrates that the 
problem is of national concern and signals the seriousness of the damage to 
victims.  As recent efforts by internet service providers to remove child 
pornography and police other dangerous or offensive content have shown, 
criminalizing deepfakes under federal law will encourage search engines and 
interactive computer services to voluntarily to address the problem.296 
B.  Proposing a Federal Criminal Statute:  The Pornographic Deepfake 
Criminalization Act 
To best address the mounting dangers of pornographic deepfakes, 
legislative action is needed.  This section proposes a new federal criminal 
statute to regulate the creation and distribution of pornographic deepfakes.  
By blending components of the ENOUGH Act and the MDFPA and adding 
other necessary elements, this law seeks to combat pornographic deepfakes 
and protect victims.  The proposed statute is set forth first and then analyzed 
below. 
1.  Proposed Statutory Text 
TITLE.—Pornographic Deepfake Criminalization Act 
(a) FINDINGS.—The legislative body finds that— 
(1) the technology necessary to create deepfakes is publicly 
available and requires no technical training, resulting in the quick 
proliferation of deepfakes; 
(2) pornographic deepfakes, like revenge pornography, are a form 
of nonconsensual pornography; 
(3) victims of nonconsensual pornography can suffer serious 
emotional and psychological harms and can fear for their physical 
safety; and 
(4) nonconsensual pornography disproportionately victimizes 
women and girls. 
(b) PURPOSE.—The purposes of this statute are to— 
(1) criminalize the nonconsensual creation and distribution of 
pornographic deepfakes; 
(2) protect victims, and provide victims with adequate remedies; 
and 
(3) hold content creators and service providers accountable. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 
 
 296. Alanna Petroff, Google, Microsoft Move to Block Child Porn, CNN BUS. (Nov. 18, 
2013, 9:10 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/11/18/technology/google-microsoft-child-
porn/index.html [https://perma.cc/6V7F-JFQM]. 
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(1) AUDIOVISUAL RECORD.—The term “audiovisual record” 
means— 
(A) any audio or visual media in an electronic format; and 
(B) any photograph, motion picture, film, video recording, 
electronic image, or sound recording. 
(2) DEEPFAKE.—The term “deepfake” means an audiovisual 
record created or altered in a manner that the record would falsely 
appear to a reasonable observer to be an authentic record of the actual 
speech, conduct, image, or likeness of an individual. 
(3) INDIVIDUAL.—The term “individual” refers to either a person 
whose body is depicted or a person whose face is depicted in the 
deepfake and the term “individuals” refers to all depicted persons. 
(4) PORNOGRAPHIC DEEPFAKE.—The term “pornographic 
deepfake” means any deepfake (as defined in paragraph (2))— 
(A) in which— 
(i) either individual is, or is depicted to be, engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct; or 
(ii) the naked genitals or post-pubescent female 
nipples of any individual are visible; 
(B) in an original or modified format, such as with a filter or 
text overlay. 
(5) SEXUALLY EXPLICIT CONDUCT.—The term “sexually explicit 
conduct” has the meaning given in section 2256(2)(A). 
(6) INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICE.—The term ‘interactive 
computer service’ has the same meaning given that term in Section 
230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 230). 
(7) INFORMATION CONTENT PROVIDER.—The term ‘information 
content provider’ has the same meaning given that term in Section 
230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 230). 
(d) OFFENSE.—Except as provided in subsection (g), it shall be 
unlawful to knowingly use any means or facility of interstate or foreign 
commerce to distribute or create a pornographic deepfake— 
(1) with knowledge or reckless disregard for— 
(A) the lack of consent of the individual or individuals to the 
use of their likeness or image in the creation or distribution of the 
pornographic deepfake; and 
(B) the harm that the distribution could cause to the 
individual or individuals; 
(2) without an objectively reasonable belief that such distribution 
touches upon a matter of public concern. 
(e) PENALTY.—Any person who violates subsection (d) shall be— 
(1) fined under this title, imprisoned for no more than 5 years, or 
both; 
(2) fined under this title, imprisoned for no more than 10 years, or 
both, in the case of a second or subsequent violation; or 
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(3) fined under this title, imprisoned for no more than 10 years, or 
both, in the case of a violation where any individual depicted in the 
deepfake is a minor. 
(f) REMEDIES.—Remedies shall be in the court’s discretion and shall 
promote the purposes set forth in subsection (b).  Potential remedies 
include, but are not limited to— 
(1) issuance of an order to destroy the audiovisual record; 
(2) issuance of an order compelling an interactive computer 
service or information content provider to remove or take down the 
audiovisual record; 
(3) issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction to prevent the 
further distribution of the deepfake; 
(4) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs; 
(5) damages or restitution to the victims; and 
(6) any other relief that the court deems to be proper. 
(g) EXCEPTIONS.— 
(1) LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.—
This section— 
(A) does not prohibit any lawful law enforcement, 
correctional, or intelligence activity; 
(B) shall not apply in the case of an individual reporting 
unlawful activity in good faith; and 
(C) shall not apply in the case of a document production or 
filing associated with a legal proceeding. 
(2) SERVICE PROVIDERS.—This section shall not apply to any 
provider of a communication service with regard to content provided 
by another information content provider unless the provider of the 
communications service intentionally solicits, or distributes 
knowingly or with reckless disregard, content that is in violation of 
this section. 
(h) THREATS AND EXTORTION.—Any person who intentionally 
threatens to commit an offense under subsection (d), regardless of whether 
the threat is an act of extortion, shall be punished as provided in subsection 
(e). 
(i) VENUE AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY.—A prosecution under this 
section may be brought in a district where the defendant or either depicted 
individual resides or in a district where the pornographic deepfake is 
distributed or made available.  There is extraterritorial federal jurisdiction 
over an offense under this section if the defendant or depicted individual 
is a citizen or permanent resident of the United States. 
2.  Analyzing the Pornographic Deepfake Criminalization Act 
This proposed statute seeks to strike a balance between protecting victims, 
punishing wrongdoers, and protecting freedom of expression.  Subsections 
(a) through (c) set forth the context, purpose, and framework of this law.  
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Unlike the MDFPA, the new law proposed here is narrowly tailored to 
address only pornographic deepfakes and, in contrast to the ENOUGH Act, 
it explicitly covers simulated nonconsensual pornography.297  By framing the 
law within the context of nonconsensual pornography and highlighting the 
disproportionate harms caused to women, the law’s purpose is made clear 
and the need for regulation is underscored.298 
Further, the definitions clarify the law’s reach and purpose.  Seeking to 
build upon the definition of deepfakes set forth in the MDFPA while avoiding 
overbreadth problems, this statute adds the modifier “pornographic” to 
“deepfake.”299  By focusing on deepfakes portraying “sexually explicit 
conduct,”300 the scope of the law is further limited.  This constraint is crucial 
to the law’s success in protecting the victims of nonconsensual pornography 
while also reducing the risk of the law’s misuse to prosecute harmless 
deepfakes.  The statute also carefully incorporates both victims of deepfakes 
in its definition of affected persons.  This protects both individuals whose 
likeness and image have in some way been manipulated and shared without 
their consent.301 
Subsection (d) begins with a federal jurisdictional requirement302 and sets 
forth the offense specifically criminalized by the statute—the creation or 
distribution of a pornographic deepfake with knowledge or reckless disregard 
for the lack of consent of either victim to the use of their likeness or image 
in the deepfake and the potential harms caused to the victim.  Intentional 
threats to commit this offense are also included under subsection (h).  
Accordingly, this offense applies to those who create or distribute 
pornographic deepfakes and broadens the requisite mens rea to punish those 
who act with the knowledge or recklessness.303  An intent requirement is not 
included lightly.  On the one hand, as has been argued in the context of 
revenge porn, a requirement that the actor disclose or distribute an image 
with the specific intent to harm or harass may leave victims unprotected and 
 
 297. See supra Part IV.A.2.b (noting that pornographic deepfakes do not fit within the 
framework of the ENOUGH Act); see also supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing overbreadth 
concerns pertaining to the MDFPA). 
 298. See supra Part I.C (discussing deepfakes in the nonconsensual pornography context 
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 299. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing overbreadth concerns pertaining to the MDFPA). 
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 301. See supra Part II.A (defining and recognizing the victims); see also supra Part IV.A 
(highlighting the challenges posed by the “identifiable victim” requirement incorporated in 
many state revenge porn laws and the ENOUGH Act). 
 302. See supra Part V.B.1; see also Aubrey Burris, Note, Hell Hath No Fury Like a Woman 
Porned:  Revenge Porn and the Need for a Federal Nonconsensual Pornography Statute, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 2325, 2354 (2014). 
 303. See supra Part IV.A.2.a (discussing concerns about the ability of prosecutors to 
successfully prove the requisite mens rea in many state revenge porn statutes). 
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make the crime unnecessarily difficult to prove.304  On the other hand, 
organizations like the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation have 
historically opposed statutes that do not include an “intent to harm” provision 
under the theory that failure to require proof of intent may violate the First 
Amendment.305  The proposed statute here, which includes recklessness as 
an alternative mens rea, is a reasonable compromise.  The consent 
conundrum posed by many revenge porn laws306 is also alleviated as the 
proposed law requires knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the victim’s 
lack of consent to the use of their image in the deepfake.  Similarly, there is 
no actual harm requirement; harm is included in the mens rea requirement of 
subsection (d)(1)(B).307 
Moreover, the offense does not punish those who had an “objectively 
reasonable belief that such distribution touches upon a matter of public 
concern.”308  This provision is patterned on the ENOUGH Act and seeks to 
ensure that legitimate First Amendment activity is not criminalized.309  This 
provision is also more narrowly drafted than the First Amendment provision 
included in the MDFPA.310 
The statute provides for two categorical exceptions in subsection (g)—law 
enforcement and service providers.  The exception for service providers 
comports with section 230 immunity311 but is not unlimited.  This proposal 
advocates for imposing liability where “the communications service 
intentionally solicits, or distributes knowingly or with reckless disregard, 
content that is in violation of this section.”312  Although it is difficult to hold 
internet platforms liable, this law encourages providers to self-regulate and 
put screening mechanisms in place.313 
The final components of this proposed law are the penalties set forth in 
subsection (e) and remedies set forth in subsection (f).  The base-level 
penalties are drawn from the proposed ENOUGH Act; a five-year sentence 
emphasizes the severity of the crime and has been successfully incorporated 
in other nonconsensual pornography statutes.314  This proposal additionally 
adds heightened sentences for repeat offenders or crimes involving minors.  
 
 304. Roffer, supra note 136, at 979–80. 
 305. See id. at 979; see also Danny O’Brien & Dia Kayyali, Facing the Challenge of Online 
Harassment, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2015/01/facing-challenge-online-harassment [https://perma.cc/9994-VK52]. 
 306. See supra Part IV.A.2.b. 
 307. See supra Part IV.A.2.a (discussing challenges associated with the actual harm 
requirements in many state revenge porn statutes); see also supra Part V.B.1. 
 308. See supra Part V.B.1 (quoting section (d)(2) of the proposed statute). 
 309. See supra Part IV.B (detailing the First Amendment implications of content-based 
regulations). 
 310. See S. 3805, 115th Cong. (2018) (“No person shall be held liable under this section 
for any activity protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.”). 
 311. See supra Part II.B (detailing the implications of the CDA for attempts to regulate 
deepfakes). 
 312. See supra Part V.B.1 (quoting section (g)(2) of the proposed statute). 
 313. Many platforms have already taken steps to self-regulate nonconsensual pornography. 
See Petroff, supra note 296. 
 314. See Citron & Franks, supra note 41, at 365–67 (discussing penalties). 
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Beyond solely penalizing offenders, this proposal includes remedies for 
victims.  Given the serious and often long-lasting harms suffered by victims 
of nonconsensual pornography, it is imperative that the law assists victims.  
The statute gives courts discretion to grant remedies that protect and 
compensate victims and allows for a court order for the destruction of 
original copies of deepfakes and removal from platforms to protect victims 
from further harm.315  Further, restraining orders may be appropriate.  The 
statute also advises reasonable attorney’s fees and costs and damages or 
restitution where appropriate.316 
C.  Supplementing the Pornographic Deepfake Criminalization Act:  
Extralegal Solutions 
In addition to enacting a federal criminal statute, solutions and support 
should be developed to combat nonconsensual deepfake pornography, 
including education and training for law enforcement, the public, and the 
judiciary; support from organizations and advocacy groups; and 
technological responses.  This section highlights each in turn. 
1.  Awareness, Education, and Training 
For a criminal statute such as that proposed here to have its full effect—to 
deter and punish the criminal conduct—it requires that potential perpetrators, 
law enforcement, and the judiciary gain a greater awareness and 
understanding of pornographic deepfakes and their harms.  It is important to 
promote the idea that the potential victims are not only celebrities and public 
figures but anyone whose image has been digitally captured.  The first step 
is to educate the public on the harms of nonconsensual deepfake pornography 
through the use of public service announcements on the internet and in 
traditional media.  Information about the crime should be included in 
education programs in schools as part of their sexual education curricula and 
on college campuses and in workplaces as a part of sexual harassment and 
discrimination training. 
Law enforcement and the judiciary need training and education as well.  
Law enforcement has a history of trivializing domestic violence and other 
forms of sexual violence and harassment of women in both the home and 
workplace, treating these crimes as a private matter or something that must 
be tolerated as a part of the everyday work environment.317  Law 
enforcement’s hands-off attitude persists in its approach to cyberharassment 
crimes, including revenge porn.318  Law enforcement and the judiciary must 
 
 315. See supra Part V.B.1 (citing section (e) of the proposed statute). 
 316. See supra Part V.B.1 (citing section (f) of the proposed statute). 
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help victims of revenge porn or cyberharassment. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN 
CYBERSPACE 20–21, 41, 84–85 (1st ed. 2014).  For example, when a victim of online 
harassment went to the police, the officers did not take her fear seriously, said “[b]oys will be 
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 318. See generally id. 
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be better equipped to address and take these crimes seriously; they need 
sensitivity training, education in the law, and regular updates and training on 
the rapidly changing technology, computer software, and applications.  Law 
enforcement officers and judges also need technological tools to recognize 
pornographic deepfakes. 
In addition to more effective law enforcement, educating stakeholders 
about pornographic deepfakes may also result in a decrease in the number of 
pornographic deepfakes.  Such was the case for incidents of domestic 
violence.319  To make similar progress, law enforcement, the judiciary, and 
the public must understand technology and its relationship to deepfakes, as 
well as the consequences.  When attitudes shift to understanding the problem 
and working toward a solution, the law will have its intended effect. 
2.  Advocacy and Support Groups 
Currently, no advocacy or support groups exclusively focused on assisting 
victims of pornographic deepfakes exist.  Until such groups emerge, victims 
of pornographic deepfakes should seek assistance, guidance, and support 
from groups focused on revenge porn, and anti–revenge porn advocates 
should be encouraged to lend support to victims of deepfakes because both 
sets of victims suffer similarly. 
After becoming a victim of revenge porn in the 2000s, Holly Jacobs320 
started a campaign called “End Revenge Porn,” which began as a petition to 
lawmakers to criminalize the act and then grew into a place for victims to 
seek advice and information.321  Eventually, the campaign incorporated the 
Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI), which advocates “for technological, 
social, and legal innovation to fight online abuse” as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit.322  
This victim resource provides everything from a crisis hotline to low-cost or 
pro bono support and services to those who fall victim to the sharing of these 
graphic images without their consent.323  The CCRI provides information on 
how to report nonconsensual posts and send takedown requests.324  It also 
continues to advocate for legislative change and provides model state and 
federal laws for legislators to consider adopting to criminalize revenge 
porn.325 
Other national campaigns, such as “Without My Consent,” target online 
privacy violations and harassment as a whole, with a special focus on 
 
 319. See Citron, supra note 92, at 409 (detailing the legal development that transformed 
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 322. About Us, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/welcome/ 
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nonconsensual pornography.326  A powerful tool for victims, Without My 
Consent provides numerous resources, including hotlines, victim advocacy 
programs, lawyers, data, blogs, and an in-progress overview of laws in each 
of the fifty states, as well as a federal overview.327 
Further, each state may provide resources to victims.  California’s attorney 
general, for example, has launched a “Cyber Exploitation” campaign and 
provided online resources for victims and law enforcement.328  According to 
the Office of the Attorney General, “Posting intimate images online without 
consent undermines privacy, basic civil rights, and public safety.”329  Studies 
cited by the office show that cyberexploitation, just like sexual harassment, 
rape, and domestic violence, disproportionately harms women and girls.330  
The Office of the Attorney General has therefore undertaken an “initiative to 
#EndCyberExploitation [which] focuses on four specific areas:  (1) the 
Attorney General’s Task Force; (2) Litigation[;] (3) Legislative Advocacy; 
and (4) Law Enforcement Training & Education.”331  Other states and the 
federal government should follow California’s lead. 
3.  Technological Responses 
Even as the creation or distribution of pornographic deepfakes are 
prosecuted under a federal statute, other actions may simultaneously be taken 
that rely on existing technologies to provide remedies for victims. 
a.  Takedown Requests 
A deepfake victim may not even be aware of the creation of the material 
or its distribution.  Once a person becomes aware of the content, they can 
begin to send requests to have the material removed, even before the 
perpetrator is apprehended and prosecuted.  The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act332 (DMCA) allows content to be removed by request of the 
owner of the copyrighted content.333  This is a widely accepted and standard 
procedure for website owners and providers.334  These requests can be made 
when the victim is the owner of the content and finds it “online without their 
permission,” even if the content has not been copyrighted.335  The DMCA 
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does not, however, provide a solution for a deepfake video, where the victim 
does not own the copyright.  Technically, these videos can infringe on both 
the rights of the individuals featured in the original video, as well as the 
people whose faces are being used.336  This is especially true where the 
person’s face being used is that of a celebrity.337  In a digital impersonation 
takedown request, two competing views exist.  First, the owner of the content 
may be only the person who created the original video.  This would mean 
that only the victim whose body is shown could submit a request.  
Alternatively, the DMCA website provides that a takedown request can be 
made by anyone who is the subject of a video—a provision arguably broad 
enough to include all deepfake victims.338 
Although a takedown request under DMCA may fail to provide complete 
protection to a deepfake victim, other means exist to request that materials 
be removed from websites.339  Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit, and 
Tumblr each have their own internal reporting and takedown processes for 
nonconsensual pornography.340  In contrast to the DMCA, a victim can report 
a pornographic deepfake even if they do not have a copyright interest; this 
report will remove the content from the platform.  The CCRI website 
provides a victim resources section that is complete with takedown or 
reporting instructions for each of these social media platforms.341  Victims 
can also unfollow, unfriend, or block users; however, this would do nothing 
to help remove the content.342 
b.  Third-Party Monitors 
The development of deepfake technology may create a market for what is 
being called an “immutable authentication trail,”343 which allows a person to 
pay for a service (akin to a financial credit monitoring service) to monitor a 
person’s digital data, movement, and images.344  The service could track a 
person’s physical movement and in-person communications along with their 
electronic data, communications, navigation history, and internet presence, 
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including social media.345  In theory, a company would have the power to 
identify fake information about a client and could work on the client’s behalf 
to remove the identified fake information.346 
As the technology to create deepfakes is developing at a rapid pace, so too 
are various ways that technology can detect them.  Online and digital content 
are currently authenticated using machine learning algorithms, watermarks, 
digital keys, and fingerprint authorizations.  It is foreseeable that detection 
technology will also continue to evolve.  The first of these, machine learning 
algorithms, is already in use today.347  The algorithm used by Gfycat, for 
example, can detect when a video is fake by comparing it to the original 
content.348  Because the algorithm is not currently able to access videos on 
private servers or private social media accounts, the deepfake image or video 
must be posted on the internet for the algorithm to function.349 
A technological “arms race” is underway to diffuse false information, 
photos, and videos.350  The ideal response “to the deepfake threat would be 
the simultaneous development and diffusion of software capable of rapidly 
and reliably flagging deep fakes” that can also keep “pace with innovations 
in deep fake technology.”351  Currently, however, the technology required to 
monitor and address the problem has not kept up with the software available 
to create deepfakes.352  Thus, a federal criminal law remedy is warranted 
now. 
CONCLUSION 
Pornographic deepfakes are the latest phenomenon in sex exploitation 
cybercrimes, which have emerged in the last few years as the internet has 
proliferated into the daily lives of millions of people.  Although many initial 
pornographic deepfake victims were female celebrities, the rapid 
advancement and widespread accessibility of AI technology means that 
anyone who has appeared in a digital image may now “star” in a 
pornographic deepfake without their consent.  Like revenge porn, 
pornographic deepfakes arrived on the scene before policymakers and 
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legislatures could respond.  Because no federal or state laws currently 
criminalize the creation or distribution of pornographic deepfakes, and 
because this conduct is not limited to a single jurisdiction, a national response 
rooted in federal criminal law and centered on pornographic deepfakes is 
required because everyone, everywhere is a potential victim. 
